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This study attempted to identify the extent to which
nonferrous foundry subcontractors have taken the position of
refusing to participate in Department of Defense business
and the principal reasons for this refusal. A survey ques-
tionnaire was sent to 1,326 domestic nonferrous foundries to
obtain data on their attitudes concerning participation in
DOD business. An analysis of subcontractor responses
indicates that approximately 20% of the surveyed firms
refuse, or intend to refuse, to participate in DOD business.
The principal reasons for this refusal include inflexible
Government procurement methods/policies, burdensome
paperwork requirements and more attractive commercial sales
to non-DOD prime contractors. The study analyzes each of
these reasons as well as 20 additional problem areas. The
differences between foundry subcontractors that intend to
get out of DOD business and those subcontractors who are
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I. INTRODUCTION
Concerns over a perceived decline in the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) have resulted in Congressional
Hearings and numerous studies focusing on the extent of the
apparent decline, the various reasons for it, and its effect
on defense industrial mobilization and surge capabilities.
Hearings and research conducted on the DIB strongly suggest
that any problems associated with a shrinking, less
competitive, less productive industrial base are particulary
acute at its lower tier subcontractor levels. Among many
hypothesized reasons for a shrinking subcontractor base is
the suggestion that a growing number of capable subcontrac-
tors are becoming unwilling to accept Department of Defense
(DOD) business.
This study analyzes one lower tier industry in the DIB:
the foundry industry. The research was conducted in order
to determine if foundries are unwilling to become involved
with DOD business. The foundry industry is critical to both
the national economy and the DOD. It is often cited by
Government policymakers and academ.ic researchers as an
example of how our apparently shrinking industrial base is
creating high cost, long leadtime, lower quality components
for use in today's complex weapon systems. Worse, the
domestic foundry industry is used as an example to
illustrate the negative consequences of ineffective
Government regulatory, tax and profit policies, lack of
sufficient industry capital investment and subsidized
foreign competition.
This study focuses its research efforts on foundry
industry subcontractors who refuse, or intend to refuse, to
participate in DOD business. It attempts to analyze the
reasons why those foundries do not participate in DOD
business and determine their procurement policy
implications.
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
The research objective of this study is to conduct an
analysis of lower tier foundry subcontractors who refuse to
participate in DOD business in order to determine the
magnitude of the problem and the most significant reasons
for it.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding research objective, the primary
research question in this study was, "To what extent do
foundry subcontractors refuse to participate in DOD
business?"
In addition to the primary research question, the
following subsidiary research questions were formulated:
1, What are the key reasons for refusing DOD business?
2. Can any foundry industry trends be identified?
3.
What procurement reforms would have the greatest
impact on foundry willingness to accept DOD business?
4. What are the implications for procurement policy?
C. RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS
The initial research hypothesis was: "Increasing
numbers of foundries are refusing to participate in DOD
business either directly as prime contractors or indirectly
as subcontractors. There are identifiable reasons for this
non-participation in DOD business."
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This study focuses on domestic foundry subcontractors
that currently refuse, or intend to refuse, to participate
in DOD business. Because many of these businesses could
have been DOD subcontractors in the past, but are not now,
no study limiting distinction will be based on known
commercial or defense sales. The research objective of
studying only lower tier foundry subcontractors in the DIB
presented a crucial definitional issue for the researcher.
This definitional issue involved the classification of a
firm as a subcontractor. Four categories were developed to
classify contractors in general:
1. a prime contractor who has never been a subcontractor,
2. a prime contractor who sometimes performs as a
subcontractor
,
3 a subcontractor who has never performed as a prime
contractor, and,
4. subcontractors who sometimes perform as prime
contractors.
This study identified and analyzed the last two categories
of contractors in the foundry industry. The researcher used
two additional criteria to further refine the definition of
a foundry industry subcontractor; first that 50% or more of
its total annual sales be directly applicable to subcontract
performance; and second, that the foundry identify itself as
performing primarily as a subcontractor within its industry.
While the focus of this study was on the "pure
subcontractors" in category three; subcontractors in
category four, "primarily a subcontractor," were also
studied due to the assumption that these subcontractors
would have the same reasons for not participating in DOD
business that the "pure subcontractors" had and therefore
are a valid part of this research study.
The scope of this research effort was reduced further by
studying only domestic nonferrous foundries. This was done
because of the critical importance of nonferrous castings to
the DOD and because nonferrous castings tend to represent
the more complex, state-of-the-art type castings increasing-
ly used in weapon systems. By focusing exclusively on
nonferrous foundries, the researcher was able to survey a
much larger total percentage of the actual foundry
population studied.
The researcher faced several significant research
limitations in attempting this study. The primary research
objective was to analyze the reasons why foundry
subcontractors refuse or intend to refuse DOD business.
Identifying and locating sufficient numbers of firms which
fell into this category became a significant limitation.
There are approximately 4000 domestic foundries. Out of
this domestic foundry base less than 50% are involved with
nonferrous castings. In general, foundries that refuse to
do business with the Government are extremely reluctant to
identify themselves as such. Out of choice, these firms
typically have very little visibility with the Government.
Therefore they are not on bidders lists, do not respond to
Government solicitations and are not found in various
Government maintained databases. Foundries intending to
refuse future DOD business generally do not advertise their
intentions and lose their visibility to the Government for
many of these same reasons. The foundry industry is often
characterized by its own members as secretive and somewhat
paranoid-particulary of the Government. It overwhelming
consists of small businesses operating in the proverbial
"bicycle shop" down the street. Numerous references to the
"art" and "black magic" of casting were made to this
researcher. These comments are repeated here to underscore
the difficulties in obtaining data from some of these firms.
Due to the difficulties in identifying foundries (of any
kind) possessing the attitude of refusing to participate in
DOD business, the researcher decided to survey, on a
strictly confidential basis , the largest number of foundries
possible within time and resource limitations. Given the
demographics of the foundry industry and the critical
widespread use of its cast products in the DOD, nonferrous
foundries were specifically targeted for study using a
confidential "chunk" survey. The survey methodology is
explained in Chapter III.
Another significant limitation in this study was the
inability of this researcher to randomly sample the foundry
industry for these attitudes and therefore be able to draw
probabilistic conclusions from the data obtained. A survey
methodology using random sampling was not used by the
researcher due to initial difficulties in obtaining
accurate, unbiased foundry industry data at the individual
firm level. Foundry industry data are inconsistently
collected by both foundry trade associations and the
Government. By merging various nonferrous foundry
databases, the researcher produced a usable survey mailing
list but also introduced significant bias in the process.
This was due to the nature and source of some of the
databases used.
A final limitation was the lack of current literature
concerning lower tier subcontractors in the DIB. Though
numerous studies cited acute problems at these lower tiers,
no research literature could be found with current objective
data on the health, capacity, productivity and numbers of
subcontractors in the DIB. Specific subcontractor data on
the foundry industry does not exist.
A number of significant assumptions were made at the
outset of this research effort. The most important
assumption was that a significant number of foundries
actually do refuse, or intend to refuse, DOD business and
that a sufficient number of these types of firms could be
identified for study. Another significant assumption was
that the vast majority of the domestic foundry base
consisted of small businesses performing either exclusively
or primarily subcontract work. Finally, it was assumed that
by using a survey methodology, the most significant reasons
for not participating in DOD business could be identified
and analyzed.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology was threefold. First; a
comprehensive literature review was conducted on the DIB and
the foundry industry. This review focused on concerns over
the apparent erosion-particulary at the lower tier
subcontractor level-of both the DIB and the domestic foundry
base. Second; 1,326 nonferrous foundries were identified
through an extensive search of Government and trade
association databases and subsequently surveyed on their
attitudes concerning DOD business. Third; the researcher
toured a major nonferrous foundry in the Los Angeles area
and conducted informal, confidential interviews with foundry
representatives from the area to help clarify, interpret and
analyze the preliminary data obtained from the survey. The
data collected from the survey and interviews are presented
on a non-attribution basis in Chapter IV.
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II presents the reader with background
information on DIB policy, problems and issues and provides
an overview of the domestic foundry industry. Chapter III
describes the background and development of the survey
questionnaire. Chapter IV presents an in-depth analysis of
the data obtained from the survey and clarifying insights
from the interviews. Chapter V presents principal findings,
conclusions and recommendations. Recommendations for future
research are also suggested.
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) and a description of its lower tier
subcontractors and suppliers. Following this overview, the
researcher explores the problems and issues confronting
these lower tier subcontractors and presents a brief
analysis of the reasons why contractors leave the defense
marketplace and refuse to do business with the Government.
The chapter concludes with a foundry industry overview, its
importance to the DIB and its relationship to this study. •
B. THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
1. Introduction and Background
This overview does not attempt to comprehensively
revisit the large number of studies, findings and
conclusions on the entire DIB. Rather it attempts to focus
on the supporting structure of the DIB-the lower tier
subcontractors and suppliers, the problems and issues
confronting them, and their relationships with the
Government and prime contractors. Research in this area
suggests that industrial bottleneck and production
constraint problems in a shrinking, non-competitive, non-
productive DIB are particulary acute at these lower tier
subcontractor levels. [Ref. l:pp. 2-8] Numerous reasons
are hypothesized in the literature for an eroding
subcontractors' support base. The researcher attempts to
explore and analyze the most significant ones.
The DIB is "composed of prime contractors and
supporting tiers of subcontractors, with the plant and
equipment and skilled workers, necessary to develop and
produce the hardware required to fulfill the nation's
defense programs." [Ref. 2:p. 2-1] Most of the literature
on DIB deals with problems associated with the upper tiers
of the base and its major prime contractors such as
Northrup, Rockwell and Sperry. Very little of the
literature actually analyzes the lower tier subcontractors
and suppliers which are far more numerous and essential to
the success of the prime contractors. Ironically, almost
all of the significant studies done in the last ten years
have concluded that the problems and issues confronting the
prime contractors are also felt in a more magnified way by
their lower tier subcontractors. [Ref. 3:p. 9] The
literature also concludes that these problems and issues are
forcing lower tier subcontractors and suppliers out of the
Department of Defense (DOD) marketplace and are creating an
environment where capable contractors refuse do to business
with the Government. [Ref. l:pp. 2-6]
Concerns over a shrinking, non-competitive and
increasingly less productive DIB have prompted Congressional
Hearings and numerous Government and industry studies.
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These studies have tried to determine the extent of the
apparent decline in the DIB, the various reasons for it, and
its effects on national security. These studies have
consistently identified DIB problems including diminishing
capacity, shortages in critical raw materials and
components, rapid cost growth, lengthening leadtimes,
decreasing productivity, increasing offshore procurement/
production and domestic industrial bottlenecks. [Ref. 4: pp.
3-7]
These problems and a growing national perception,
increasingly substantiated by empirical research data and
various statistical comparisons, suggest that America's
Industrial Base could be sliding into a second class status.
According to an unpublished OSD staff study by the Defense
Industrial Base Assessment Office entitled, "Strategy for
Bolstering Industrial Competitiveness," numerous basic
industries have declined and this erosion could leave the
United States without the industrial capabilities that are
critical to national security. [Ref. 5:p. I-l] This study
was directed by Dr. Robert B. Costello, Under Secretary for
Defense (Acquisition), (USD(A)), and focused not only on the
ability of America's DIB to actually produce and deliver
affordable, technologically superior weapon systems, but
also on our ability to use our industrial capabilities to
maintain a credible deterrence and our diminishing
11
leadership position in an increasingly competitive
international marketplace.
2 . Policy and Programs
Historically, the United States Government has
relied on the private sector to provide the "weapons of
war." One of the fundamental elements of a our current
national security strategy and defense policy is "...the
maintenance of a broad, technologically superior
(industrial) mobilization base...." [Ref. 6:p. 21]
Success in developing and producing weapon systems
relies heavily on this national goal of maintaining superior
technological and industrial capabilities of the DIB. [Ref.
2: p. 2-1] Congress has long recognized the national
importance of our DIB from a national security standpoint
and has enacted legislation in 1950 (the Defense Production
Act)
,
and in 1973 (the Defense Industrial Reserve Act)
, to
make the Department of Defense responsible for ensuring that
"...the existence of a viable industrial base to supply
military needs in time of national emergency...." [Ref.
7:p. 124] Presidential Executive Order 11490 and Defense
Mobilization Order VII assigned responsibility to the
Department of Defense along with industry and other
Government agencies for conducting industrial preparedness
planning. The Department of Defense has issued a series of
industrial base policy directives and instructions to
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implement the legislative and executive requirements. The
major DOD instructions include: [Ref. 2:p. 2-2 0]
- DODD 4005.1: "DOD Industrial Preparedness Production
Planning"
- DODI 4005.3: "Industrial Preparedness Planning"
- DODD 4005.16: "Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and
Material Shortages."
The Department of Defense is a logical choice for
responsibility and oversight of industrial preparedness
planning. The Department of Defense's mission is to provide
for the common defense. Deterrence of aggression is at the
foundation of its common defense mission and the deterrent
power of the U.S. military rests on the inventory of
sophisticated equipment and the human resources to manage
and operate it. These resources are drawn from and
replenished from our industrial economy. [Ref. 5:p. 11-11]
Our strong industrial economy facilitates a credible common
defense based on deterrence.
Given the recognized need for a strong, productive
industrial capability and a national policy to maintain it,
a number of DOD initiated programs have been developed in
the last eight years to address known deficiencies in the
DIB. The Technical Modernization (TECHMOD) and Industrial
Modernization Incentives Program (IMIP) are two examples of
this effort to address DIB capability and productivity
problems. Both programs represent formal agreements between
industry and DOD on financial incentives for modernizing and
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improving plant productivity and capabilities. The
incentive structure of these programs is built around shared
savings based on increased productivity achieved through
capital investment. These programs have recognized the need
to incentivize subcontractors and vendors as well as the
primes and the Air Force is currently spending $200 million
on Aerospace Industry subcontractors through these programs.
[Ref. 8:p. 1] Early Air Force successes with both TECHMOD
and IMIP spawned the Industrial Technology Modernization
(ITM) program for subcontractors. ITM essentially provides
the same types of modernization incentives for subcontrac-
tors with this program being managed by the prime
contractors. [Ref. 9:p. 26] Another program designed to
address DIB shortcomings is the Manufacturing Technology
Program (MANTECH) . The objective of MANTECH is to "assure
that advanced manufacturing processes and equipment are
available to defense contractors to enable them to
significantly improve their productivity and responsiveness
as elements of the defense industrial base." [Ref. 10:p.
201] The purpose of this program is to reduce acquisition
costs and production leadtimes by funding advanced
manufacturing technology and equipment in situations where
the private sector is unable or unwilling to do so.
Differing from the TECHMOD and IMIP programs, MANTECH is
totally funded by Government sources. MANTECH monies are
usually invested in high risk-high payoff state-of-the art
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technologies and materials. [Ref. 11 :p. 32] Carbon
composite and metal matrix materials technologies are two
current areas where MANTECH monies are being invested. Each
of these programs has met with varying degrees of success at
improving DIB deficiencies. It is important to note that
these programs have been primarily directed towards the
major prime contractors with relatively little emphasis on
the supporting lower tier subcontractors. Additionally, the
prime contractors in these programs are often reluctant to
flow down these development/productivity incentives to their
subcontractors. Finally these programs appear to suffer
from budgeting constraints and limited/cyclical service
sponsor interest.
3 . Composition and Interrelationships
The DIB consists of tens of thousands of business
firms and Government facilities that produce the weapons and
services used by the Department of Defense. These firms
that collectively make up the DIB include large corporations
as well as small privately owned family businesses. Many of
these firms manufacture/provide both defense and non-defense
products. The larger firms typically act as weapon systems
integrators and assemblers of equipment, such as aircraft
and missiles, while the smaller firms typically design and
manufacture piece parts, components and subassemblies which
are used by the larger prime contractors. [Ref. 4: p. 1]
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The DIB can be thought of as a "pyramid" built from
the base up on "procurement tiers." These tiers are
composed of the various large and small businesses. Firms
that directly contract with the Department of Defense are
known as prime contractors or "primes." These primes
represent the top of this multi-layered pyramid or its first
tier. Below the first tier level primes are the thousands
of second and third tier level firms who generally do not
directly deal or contract with the Department of Defense.
These second and third tier firms are the "subcontractors"
and "parts suppliers" which supply the piece parts,
components and subassemblies used by the primes in the first
procurement tier.
There are approximately 25,000 to 30,000 prime
contractors which supply the Department of Defense with
weapon systems and major components. Supporting these prime
contractors are approximately 50,000 subcontractors and
parts suppliers in the lower tiers. [Ref. 4: p. 1] Some of
the literature suggests that the base may actually contain
as many as 60,000 prime contractors and hundreds of
thousands of subcontractors. [Ref. 12: p. 75] Even though
these estimates appear to suggest that a large industrial
base exists at the prime contractor level they are
misleading. The most current data obtainable by the
researcher (FY86) indicates that the top 200 prime
contractors for the Department of Defense accounted for
16
75.1% of all contract award dollars for contracts over the
small purchase threshold of $25,000. [Ref. 13 :p. 21]
Estimating the actual size of this base (particulary
below the prime contractor level) is extremely difficult
because of its constantly fluctuating state and the complex
interrelationships between the firms within it. In fact, no
data have been collected on the lower tier (and far more
numerous) subcontractors by the Department of Defense since
1963. [Ref. 7:p. 129] Firms constantly enter and exit the
base at each tier level (though to a much lessor degree at
the prime contractor level) and change the amount and
proportion of the resources they devote to their defense
products and services. These DOD products and services can
represent all or only part of a firm's business base and can
be produced with or without using Government resources. The
following examples illustrate some of the different mixes of
resources used within the DIB: there are Government owned
and Government operated facilities, Government owned
contractor operated facilities, contractor owned facilities
operating with Government owned equipment and wholly
contractor owned facilities. [Ref. 14 :p. 11]
Finally, determining whether a firm is a prime
contractor or a subcontractor is complex and difficult. It
can depend on the contractual relationship between a
business and the Government while producing a particular
weapon system. A firm may identify itself as a prime
17
contractor for one particular weapon system and as a
subcontractor for others. In other words, many prime
contractors for one major weapon system are often
subcontractors on others. [Ref. 15: p. 2] In "An Analysis
of Reasons Companies Refuse to Participate in Defense
Business," Dr. David V. Lamm found that 62.8% of the
companies responding to his survey considered themselves to
be both a prime contractor and a subcontractor. [Ref. 16 :p.
78] This complex, pyramidal structure of the DIB is
illustrated in the following figures.
Figure 2-1 illustrates the multi-layered procurement
tiers from the prime contractors down to the supporting base
of sub-subcontractors and parts suppliers. Each tier is
tied to the others in a production relationship where raw
resources are converted into increasingly more complex
products as they move "up" the pyramidal structure of the
DIB.
Figure 2-2 illustrates the critical prime and
subcontractors in each procurement tier for five major
weapon systems studied by the General Accounting Office.
There are many more supporting lower tier level subcontrac-
tors than are shown in Figure 2-2. Only those subcontrac-
tors involved with manufacturing critical components and
vulnerable to potential production constraints are shown.
Notice the interrelationships between the firms in each of
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Figure 2-2 CRITICAL PRIME/SUB CONTRACTORS FOR FIVE
WEAPON SYSTEMS
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Microwave Associates and Cercast. Also notice that
traditional prime contractors such as Hughes and Northrup
are acting as lower tier subcontractors to other prime
contractors for these particular weapon systems.
The production relationships between each
procurement tier of the DIB ultimately define the success of
the relatively few prime contractors in producing state of
the art, high quality, reasonably priced weapon systems for
the DOD. It is the supporting lower tiers of the DIB which
convert the vast majority of these raw resources into the
basic products, components and subassemblies that the upper
tier prime contractors integrate into weapon systems. Most
of the literature reviewed suggests that if an industrial
base problem exists, it is with these basic lower tiers that
drive it. It is in the lower tiers where the greatest
erosion of the DIB has occurred and it is the loss of these
lower tier subcontractors and suppliers that create the
longer leadtimes, production constraints and escalating
prices that concern policymakers so much. The next section
of this chapter explores and analyzes the forces affecting
the lower tiers of the DIB.
C. THE SUBCONTRACTOR BASE
1 Introduction
The literature cites both direct and indirect
constraints on the DIB's productive capacity and its ability
to surge and mobilize. Relatively few production contraints
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appear to exist at the prime contractor level. [Ref. 4:p.
vi] This is not true for the lower tiers of the DIB. The
literature suggests that it is really the lower tiers of the
DIB which represent the bottlenecks and significant
production constraints due to the "difficulties in obtaining
necessary items from subcontractors, resulting at least in
part from a shortage of smaller, lower-tier suppliers."
[Ref. 4: p. 2] This chapter segment will explore the forces
affecting these lower tier subcontractors and suppliers and
analyzes how those forces are causing the lower tiers to
shrink in size, inhibiting competition, creating longer
leadtimes and causing price increases.
2 . Problems and Issues
Materials and components procured from lower tier
subcontractors and suppliers represent 50% to 80% of the
Department of Defense's total procurement costs. [Ref. 5: p.
V-7] The magnitude of these procurement costs with the
lower tiers of the DIB make understanding the factors
affecting those lower tiers critical. In his book, The
Defense Industry , Dr. Jacques Gansler ponders the question
of why the Congress and the DOD think in terms of only the
giant prime contractors such as Lockheed and Hughes; not in
terms of these critical lower tier subcontractors. Gansler
rhetorically asks why they (the Congress and DOD)
,
...assume that legislation, regulations, policies, and
procedures should be applied equally to the large and the
small contractors, to those that deal directly with the
22
government and those that deal through prime contractors;
and to those that supply weapon systems and those who
supply parts? [Ref. 7:p. 128]
Gansler asserts that there are "gross differences" between
the upper and lower tiers of the DIB and that the
application of uniform legislative and regulatory policy
serves to amplify the existing problems within the DIB and
the differences between its tiers. He believes these
problems and differences are causing the exit of substantial
numbers of lower tier subcontractors from the defense
marketplace. [Ref. 7:pp. 129-130]
The exit of these firms from the DIB has been
particulary acute in the semiconductor, shipbuilding, ball
and roller bearing, foundry, forging and machine tool
industries. According to Roderick L. Vawter, each of these
industries in terms of capacity, technology, and interna-
tional competitiveness is declining. [Ref. 17:pp. 39-52]
The foundry, machine tools and forging industries are
illustrative of this decline. Since January 1, 1980 more
than 600 foundries have closed out of a total domestic
foundry base of approximately 4000 foundries. [Ref. 18 :p.
32] Since 1979, the machine tool industry has experienced a
75% decline in new orders and total employment has fallen by
65%. Imported high tech machine tools now account for over
50% of the market. [Ref. 19 :p. 40] More than 90% of the
semi-conductors used in this country are now produced
offshore. [Ref. 20:p. vii]
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Many of the lower tier subcontractors and suppliers
in these industries are sole sources for the products they
produce. Their exit from the defense marketplace is a
critical, growing problem. The problem of diminishing and
increasingly less capable sources is seen among both high
technology subcontractors and suppliers of conventional
parts. Table 2-1 illustrates a number of critical weapon
system areas in which there are only a few subcontractors.
TABLE 2-1
CRITICAL AREAS WITH SMALL NUMBERS OF SUBCONTRACTORS
Equipment type Number
Airborne radar systems 2
Aircraft Engines 2
Aircraft Landing Gears 3
Aircraft navigation systems 2
Infrared systems 2
Tank hull castings 1
RPV/drone engines 2
Source: Gansler, The Defense Industry . 1981.
The Defense Industrial Base Panel of the House Armed
Services Committee recognized these problems and the erosion
occurring in the lower tiers of the DIB. The panel, chaired
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by Representative Richard H. Ichord, stated in December 1980
that,
...there has been a serious decline in the nation's
defense industrial capability that places our national
security in jeopardy. An alarming erosion of crucial
industrial elements, coupled with a mushrooming dependence
on foreign sources for critical materials, is endangering
our defense posture at its very foundation. [Ref. 21:p.
Ill]
The panel found that the general condition of the DIB had
deteriorated and was in danger of continuing to deteriorate.
The panel specifically reported that:
- the defense industrial base was unbalanced; while excess
production capacity generally exists at the prime
contractor level, there are serious deficiencies at the
subcontractor level;
- the industrial base is not capable of surging production
rates in a timely fashion to meet the increased demands
that could be brought on by a national emergency;
- lead times for military equipment have increased
significantly during the past three years;
- the U.S. is becoming increasingly dependent on foreign
sources for critical raw materials as well as for some
specialized components needed in military equipment;
- productivity growth rates for the manufacturing sector
of the U.S. economy are the lowest among all free world
industrialized nations; the productivity growth rate of
the defense sector is lower than the overall
manufacturing sector; and
- the means for capital investment in new technology,
facilities and machinery have been constrained by
inflation, unfavorable tax policies, and management
priorities. [Ref. 21:p. 11]
In the opinion of the researcher, these findings are
as valid today, if not more so, as they were in 1980. The
real impact of these problems becomes apparent when they are
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studied collectively. The researcher has organized these
factors into three interrelated categories loosely defined
as: 1) the business base and market forces, 2) the prime
contractor/subcontractor relationship, and 3) the
legislative and regulatory environment. Each of these
categories is presented and analyzed below.
3 . Business Base and Market Forces
There is a great deal of turbulence and instability
within the DIB. It is dramatically affecting the lower tier
subcontractors and forcing their exit from the defense
marketplace. [Ref. 3: p. 80] The Ichord Panel was very
blunt on this point specifically stating that the
...lower tier subcontractors in the defense industrial
base are generally hit harder by the instabilities in
defense programs, have greater capital formation problems
and suffer more from the burdensome paperwork associated
with doing business with the government than their larger
counterparts in the base. [Ref. 21:p. 13]
Much of this turbulence and instability is due to defense
business base fluctuations and the impact of those
fluctuations on the ability of a smaller subcontractor to
efficiently perform, utilize capacity, and make necessary
capital investments.
Shifts in defense market demand are generated by the
Government and flow down from major prime contractors for
many reasons. These shifts in demand can be due to
unplanned program growth, significant program quantity
changes, engineering changes, program cancellations and
program stretch-outs. These shifts in demand are often
26
driven by unforseen or uncontrollable budgetary, political
and policy decisions.
Rapid increases in defense market demand bid up
skilled labor prices and impact its availability. Leadtimes
and costs increase as lower tier subcontractors struggle to
produce unexpectedly increased quantities of parts,
components and subassemblies used by the primes.
Dramatic turndown in demand also severely impact
these lower tier subcontractors. As weapon systems are
cancelled, stretched-out or gradually completed without
follow-on contracts, overhead rates increase, workforces are
reduced, capital investment decisions delayed, learning and
technical capabilities lost.
The cyclical nature of defense spending, with its
program and funding instabilities, low-volume highly
specialized products, and shifting priorities often place
the contractor in fear of cancellation or termination.
[Ref. 11 :p. 26] This peirvasive business environment risk
discourages a long-term business approach (by either the
Government or the contractor) on most defense procurement
programs and inhibits modernization or productivity
enhancing investments. This is particulary true when the
contractor is trying to maintain his profitability as
measured by return on investment (ROI) . Firms put greater
emphasis on minimal investment levels with short pay off
periods to keep their ROI high. [Ref. 11 :p. 25] Government
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and Defense business is a "program oriented business (where)
a single program can account for 25% or more of a company's
sales and profit." [Ref. 22 :p. 2-110] Lack of long-range
planning by the Government forces contractors into a
reactive mode and does little to assist the contractor in
the efficient allocation of equipment and resources for the
long-term. These business risks and short term perspective
are magnified for the subcontractor:
Not only does the subcontractor run the risk of a program
being cancelled at the DOD level, but in addition, runs
the risk of the prime contractor simply revising its make-
or-buy decision and terminating for convenience. Further,
the DOD fails to recognize, especially at the subcontrac-
tor level, the impact that changes in a subcontractor's
commercial business can have upon its Government programs.
Typically, the prime contractor has much greater
flexibility, because of its size, to mitigate changes in
its commercial business base. The subcontractor, on the
other hand, is not generally of such size that it can
perform major reorganizations and transfers of personnel
to accommodate rapid changes in business base. [Ref.
22:p. 2-111]
In addition to these increased subcontractor
business risks there appears to be much greater financial
and profitability risks at the lower tiers as well. Gansler
found a large difference in profitability between the large
prime contractors and their lower tier subcontractors
stating "in general, the small defense contractors
(subcontractors and suppliers) have lower profits and far
higher risks than the larger ones." [Ref. 7:p. 138]
Gansler also believes that large companies for a variety of
reasons,
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. . .have almost no risk of losing money whereas the small
operations have a very high probability of doing
so. . . specifically . . .a larger firm is likely to make two or
three times as much profit as a smaller firm, and with
one-third to one-half the risk-the opposite of economic
theory.... [Ref. 7: p. 141]
The lower profitability of defense subcontractors is often
due to the difference in the amount of capital (both
equipment and money) invested by the Federal Government in
the large contractors but not the smaller ones. Investment
made by the Government at the prime contractor level in the
defense industry allows the prime contractors to realize
large sales dollars with little investment of their own
while this is not the case for smaller subcontractors.
Gansler suggests that this may be true because the larger
prime contractors have more negotiation power with the
Government than smaller firms. However the overall lower
profitability of both prime contractors and subcontractors
is recognized by the capital markets making it more
difficult to raise capital.
The smaller subcontractors of the DIB are often the
least financially sound and have the most limited capital,
facilities and managerial resources. This is certainly true
relative to the larger prime contractors in the base.
However the history of military technological breakthroughs,
according to Gansler, indicates that "it has often been the
small, inventor-led firms that have made the qualitative
breakthroughs, so critical to military superiority of the
U.S. forces." [Ref. 7:p. 128] The combination of these
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business risks, lower profitability and difficulties in
obtaining inexpensive capital are forcing subcontractors out
of the defense marketplace with negative long-term
consequences. These factors also erect significant barriers
to new subcontractors, prohibiting easy entry into the
defense marketplace and exit barriers to the large prime
contractors.
4 . Prime-Subcontractor Relationship
The relationship between the prime contractor and
its supporting subcontractors is affected by many factors.
This relationship can become anything from a stable,
productive high quality relationship such as those developed
by Japanese prime contractors with their subcontractors, to
a bitter, adversarial, unstable relationship. Whatever the
relationship, it begins in earnest after a Government
contract award to a prime contractor. The prime contractor
will visit all the subcontractors in its "make vs. buy" plan
to review product and contractual requirements. Audits and
inspections of the subcontractor's capabilities occur to
establish compliance with Government requirements. On most
defense programs, subcontractors are often under contract to
supply quantities that are below the most economical
production levels. [Ref. 22 :p. 2-102]
The financial risks faced by the prime contractor
and its budget concerns often reflect themselves in the
contract negotiations between the prime and sub. These
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negotiations usually result in a fixed price type contract
for the subcontractor even though the prime may be under a
cost reimbursement type contract with the Government. [Ref.
7:p. 146] This "risk-shifting" technique used by prime
contractors often severely strains the prime-sub
relationship. In one study of prime contractors with cost
reimbursement type defense contracts, 85% of the primes'
subcontracts were firm fixed-price. [Ref. 7:p. 14 6]
Adversarial relationships often develop inhibiting long-
range planning, managerial flexibility, technical innovation
and communication between the prime and sub. This in turn
promotes the short-term perspective in business decisions,
reactive planning and discourages capital investment.
The subcontractor's products are subject to both
Government and prime contractor inspection and data
requirements. Government and prime contractor quality
control requirements flow down to the subcontractor often
becoming more stringent than what was originally called for
by the Government as the prime builds in a "safety factor"
for himself. [Ref. 7:p. 146]
Due to their size prime contractors have a number of
advantages that smaller subcontractors do not have:
Because of size, prime contractors have an inherent
leverage over subcontractors and too often abuse that
leverage through overreaching. One example of overreach-
ing is the way in which prime contractors use the
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unfettered right to terminate subs for convenience for
purposes other than those contemplated by Section 8 of the
DAR. Another example is a tendency on the part of prime
contractors to leverage one government program against the
other in dealing with subcontractors. [Ref. 22 :p. 2-104]
Prime contractors also have additional legal rights and
remedies with the Government not available to subcontractors
in their contractual relationship with the prime. One such
example is Public Law 85-804, Extraordinary Contractual
Relief. This law gives the Government the ability to
financially and contractually "bail out" prime contractors
threatened with bankruptcy if they are considered essential
to the DIB. [Ref. 23 :p. 63] While the law does not
discriminate between prime contractors and subcontractors,
the researcher is only aware of prime contractors such as
Lockheed and General Dynamics benefitting from it. The
literature often cites the reluctance of a prime contractor
to flow down "favorable" clauses from the prime contract to
the subcontract. Often only the restrictive provisions of
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) flow down to
subcontractors. Aerospace subcontractors have specifically
noted that the beneficial provisions of programs like
MANTECH and IMIP are rarely flowed down. [Ref. 22 :p. 2-103]
The "make vs. buy" decision by the prime contractor
is also a critical factor affecting the subcontractor base
and the prime-sub relationship. Vertical integration of
manufacturing processes at the prime contractor level,
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...is eroding the subcontractor base. Components and
assemblies that in 1960 would have been assigned to a
specialized subcontractor to design and build are now
designed by the prime contractor and, in many cases, also
built by the prime. [Ref. 22 :p. 2-105]
Many factors exist to encourage the "make" decision by the
prime contractor. The "make" decision has the effect of
increasing the prime's market power, workforce flexibility
and the ability to absorb more overhead. The "make"
decision also gives the prime greater control over the
engineering design and allows the prime to retain his
workforce and operate at near capacity when cyclical defense
demand begins to drop. This practice in turn amplifies the
turbulence at the lower level tiers as the primes use the
"make" decision to retain work during downturns and the
"buy" decision during the upturns. This, in effect, "is a
way for the prime contractors to shift the risk of doing
defense business onto the subcontractors." [Ref. 7:p. 13 3]
This long-term trend of vertically integrating the
manufacturing process has the effect of making the prime
both a customer and competitor on various defense programs
and ultimately reduces competition and raises prices. The
"make" decision also often has the effect of restricting
technological innovation and development at the lower tier
subcontractor level. As the prime "makes" more at his
level, engineering expertise, technical innovation,
sophisticated equipment and manufacturing processes "imbed"
themselves at the prime level. This in turn nurtures the
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relationship between the prime contractor and the defense
program manager, who in stressing state-of-the-art
technologies for incorporation into new weapon systems,
supports the "make" decision of the prime instead of the
better "buy" decision for the DIB.
5. Legislative and Regulatory Environment
The legislative and regulatory requirements placed
on both prime contractors and subcontractors are also
creating a business environment where capable contractors
decline to become involved with defense contracts. [Ref.
21 :p. 6] The current emphasis on price competition by the
Congress and Department of Defense is just one important
example. According to the Costello draft study on a
"Strategy for Bolstering Industrial Competiveness, " price
competition,
...effectively precludes the development of long-term
relationships between prime contractors and suppliers and
stimulates an adversarial relationship between them. The
absence of long-term relationships does not permit
extended, cooperative design, development, and
manufacturing exchanges between the primes and suppliers.
[Ref. 5:p. V-8]
Free and open price competition for subcontractors and
suppliers, according to this draft study, has the effect of
keeping the lower tiers of the defense industrial base in
"constant turmoil" and make it "virtually impossible" for
defense contractors to build and maintain a base of
reliable, high, quality, efficient vendors. [Ref. 5:p. V-8]
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The emphasis on price competition is just one factor
in an almost overwhelming set of legislated and regulatory
requirements facing the prospective defense contractor.
These requirements are so daunting that,
. . .many of the best qualified suppliers (refuse) to
participate due to their reluctance to become involved in
complex, expensive, and non-productive government rules
and regulations. Many desirable, highly-qualified
suppliers refuse to do business with DoD prime contractors
because of the sheer weight of compliance with the body of
laws, regulations, rules, and procedures that primes are
required to pass through from the government to them.
This narrows the range of potential suppliers and reduces
competition. [Ref. 5:p. V-8]
From the defense subcontractor perspective, commercial work
almost always appears to be more attractive than defense
work due to these flow down administrative burdens and their
costs. This is particulary true during economic upturns
when demand is high and available capacity is being
utilized. In testimony before the Ichord Panel,
subcontractors stated that they suffered more from the
paperwork requirements associated with defense business than
the large prime contractors. [Ref. 21:p. 13] Gansler
illustrates this problem by citing the following
administrative requirements which a defense contractor has
to understand and complete to successfully perform on a
defense contract. These requirements are for a relatively
unsophisticated, small quantity item:
- DoD 250 special shipping documents on small dollar
orders,
- changes in accounting systems to satisfy the Cost
Accounting Standards Act (P.L. 91-379)
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- data to satisfy the Truth in Negotiations Act (P.L. 87-
653)
- records reflecting compliance with various socioeconomic
programs, such as Equal Opportunity, Walsh-Healy, Small
Business, and Labor Surplus Utilization,
- records reflecting compliance with inspections and
testing requirements, such as MIL-I-45208,
- technical manuals and provisioning requirements beyond
normal commercial manuals, and
- a multitude of "boiler-plate" provisions which require
the advice of a lawyer. [Ref. 7:pp. 146-147]
Even these "minimum" requirements necessitate that any
defense contractor maintain a considerable staffing overhead
for administration and compliance with them. According to
Gansler, these provisions are not necessary for small firms
and are not cost effective either for the firm or the
Government. These requirements create higher overheads for
these firms and prevent them (should they accept the
business) from being competitive in the commercial market-
place.
The literature provides numerous other reasons which
cause firms to exit the defense marketplace or remain out of
it. Each reason contributing in its own way to the erosion
of the base. Restrictive profit and tax policies are two
examples. [Ref. 21 :p. 1] The ongoing controversy over
defense industry profit levels (with the perception by many
in Government that profits are too high and the perception
by many in industry that they are too low) as well as the
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various methods for "computing" profits is often cited as a
reason for exiting the DIB. [Ref. 24:pp. 1-3]
In March 1988 the Aerospace Industry, Electronic
Industry and National Security Industrial trade associations
presented Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci a study
that examined the impact of piecemeal major statutory,
regulatory, and management practice procurement changes on
the defense industry. The study was entitled, "The Impact
on Defense Industrial Capability of Changes in Procurement
and Tax Policy (1984-1987)" and was conducted by the MAC
Group, an international management consulting firm. The
study concluded that:
- ROI has been less than the return necessary to maintain
shareholder value,
- profits have been reduced by an average of 23 percent on
the companies' defense business,
- companies are being forced to borrow heavily and equity
capital is not a likely funding source,
- the changes will result in a less efficient industry,
- competition will be reduced because fewer competitors
will be willing to bid on future programs, and
- a financially-weakened industry will be less able to
compete against growing and sometimes subsidized foreign
competition. [Ref. 24:pp. 2-3]
According to the study, the implications of these
conclusions are:
- less independent research and development,
- pursuit of low risk technology alternatives,
- inability to attract the best people to the industry,
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- financially weakened subcontractors, and
- a significant industry restructuring and consolidation.
[Ref. 24:pp. 2-3]
Low defense profitability often translates as "more
attractive commercial ventures" when these firms are
surveyed on their reasons for leaving the DIB. Government
procurement policies and bidding practices are cited, often
in the context of being unfair, "rigged," or impossible to
understand due to incomplete specifications or complexity.
The growing use of "offsets" associated with Foreign
Military Sales moves critical lower tier subcontractor work
offshore. The on-again off-again nature of defense market
program demand, overly restrictive specifications, quality
and data requirements, multiple uncoordinated auditing and
inspecting requirements all contribute. Envirnomental
Protection Agency (EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA) requirements are universally cited by the foundry
industry.
Two recent studies have studied the reasons why
capable companies leave the defense market place or refuse
to enter it. The first study was a December 1986 Master's
thesis by Lt. William H. Gaffney and attempted to determine
the effectiveness of procurement workshops conducted by the
Navy Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA) . Part of his study
asked two questions of a selected sample of attendees
regarding their attitude towards Government business. The
first question asked:
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If you have not done business with the Government, do you
intend to do so in the future?
Nineteen percent (18 firms) answered in the negative. The
reasons cited for the negative response were:
Reason Number
a. not interested 2
b. too hard/complicated 6
c. burdensome paperwork 3
d. instability of Govt business 1
e. Govt bidding methods 4
f. low profitability 4
g. other 2
The second question asked:
If you are doing business with the Government, do you
intend to quit?
In this case only 6.4% of the companies responding (9 of
132) indicated they were going to quit. The primary reasons
were unfair application of regulations, more attractive
commercial ventures and contract award delays. [Ref. 25: pp.
99-100]
A second, more detailed study was conducted by Dr.
David V. Lamm in March 1987. It focused on the reasons why
capable companies refuse to participate in defense business.
Lamm surveyed a total of 1317 companies from various
industries and had a survey return rate of 32.4% (427
firms) . One of the critical questions in the Lamm survey
was question #9:
What are the primary reasons you are NOT NOW involved in
Defense business or intend to GET OUT
.
?
Out of the total 427 returned surveys 213 companies answered
question nine affirmatively. One hundred twenty two of
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these companies (57.2%) indicated they wanted DOD business
but had significant problems. Ninety One companies (42.8%)
indicated they did not want DOD business. These 91
companies (companies refusing to do business with the
government), represented 21.3% of the returned surveys.
[Ref. 16: pp. 68-72] The top six reasons for refusing
Government business or for getting out of Government
business are shown in Table 2-2.
TABLE 2-2
KEY REASONS FOR REFUSING DOD BUSINESS
Cited:
Reason Frequency % 1st 2nd
Burdensome Paperwork 147 69.0 60 26
Government Bidding
Methods 121 56.8 22 31
Inflexible Procurement
Policies 81 38.0 7 13
More Attractive
Commercial Ventures 73 34.3 7 9
Low Profitability 69 32.4 10 6
Government Attitude 69 32.4 3 10
Source: Lamm, "An Analysis of Reasons Companies Refuse
to Participate in Defense Business," unpub-
lished Naval Postgraduate School research
paper, 1986.
These results substantiate the more limited Gaffney findings
and illustrate some of the principal reasons for refusing
40
DOD business. It is interesting to note that the top three
reasons are all a function of the various legislated and
regulatory requirements levied on the defense acquisition
system. Tabular summary data from the Lamm surveys on the
reasons why companies refuse to participate in defense
business was presented in the Winter 1988 National Contract
Management Journal and is contained in Appendix A.
D. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE SUMMARY
The preceding chapter segments were designed to present
the reader with an overview of the factors affecting the
lower tiers of the DIB and contributing to its erosion. In
the opinion of the researcher, the DIB is declining in
absolute numbers of firms, productivity, international
competitiveness and (in many areas) capacity. This decline
carries with it serious implications for National Security
Policy, particulary with respect to potential surge and
mobilization requirements.
Three interrelated sets of factors appear to be driving
businesses from the DIB. Those related factors are: 1) an
unstable business base and its market forces, 2) an
adversarial risk-shifting prime-subcontractor relationship,
and 3) an overwhelming legislative and regulatory
environment. All these factors appear to much more
dramatically affect the lower tier subcontractors than the
primes. These forces are causing the supporting tiers of
the DIB to shrink as subcontractors exit the base. These
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forces are creating entry and exit barriers to this market
as well. Many specific reasons are cited for this shrinking
base throughout the literature. The most significant
reasons appear to be consistently related to:
- excessive, burdensome Government administrative
requirements
,
- inflexible procurement policies and bidding methods, and
- the cumulative, negative impact of profit, tax and
regulatory policies.
The collective impact of these factors combined with the
various business risks previously discussed has the effect
of forcing subcontractors out of the DIB and into a more
"attractive" commercial market place. This situation was
informally summed up for the researcher by a foundry
industry subcontractor. This subcontractor told the
researcher that DOD work is "...just too damn hard, too damn
complicated and too damn risky." The following, concluding
portion of this background chapter provides an overview of
the foundry industry its current problems/issues.
E. THE FOUNDRY INDUSTRY
1. Introduction
This concluding chapter segment presents a foundry
industry overview for the reader. The industry's role in
the U.S. economy is presented along with a description of
its demographics and casting processes. Significant
industry trends, problems and issues are reviewed and the
importance of U.S. nonferrous foundries to the DIB is
42
addressed. The chapter concludes with a brief explanation
of why the foundry industry was chosen for this study.
2 . Foundry Industry Overview
The United States foundry base contains between 3 4 00
and 4200 foundries. [Refs. 26:p. 2; 27 :p. xiii; 18 :p. 32;
28 :p. 1] The actual size of the domestic foundry base is
difficult to estimate due to inaccurate, inconsistently
collected data and the particular definitions and
assumptions concerning the industry being used by the
researcher. In the opinion of this researcher the current
domestic foundry base consists of slightly less than 4000
foundries. This opinion is based on data available to the
researcher from the 1987 Foundry Management and Technology
Census and numerous discussions with foundry trade
association representatives.
Despite a significant decline in its size over the
last two decades, the U.S. foundry industry is a giant in
the world foundry market. The United States is the world's
largest producer of castings accounting for an average 2 5%
share of total world production. The United States is also
the largest producer of nonferrous castings as well,
accounting for 26% of total world production. [Ref. 27 :p.
4] Foundries represent the fifth largest manufacturing
industry in the United States and produced $15 billion worth
of castings for over 50,000 different customers last year.
[Ref. 28:p. 1]
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Foundries produce castings products which are
"...used in 90% of all manufactured goods and in all capital
goods machinery used in manufacturing." [Ref. 27 :p. xiii]
These castings run in size and weight from one ounce
artificial heart valves to multi-ton tank turrets and
hundred ton presses. Castings are usually manufactured to
be components of finished goods produced by other
manufacturers. Because castings are used in so many
manufacturing processes and products the foundry industry is
one of the most basic components in the American industrial
economy. [Ref. 26 :p. 2]
Metals used by domestic foundries can generally be
described as "ferrous" (iron derivative metals/alloys) or
"nonferrous" (non-iron base metals such as aluminum, zinc,
copper, titanium, etc.). These ferrous and nonferrous
metals are used in two basic types of foundries: production
foundries and jobbing or contract foundries. These
foundries differ in the quantity and types of castings they
produce. Production foundries concentrate on a few, high
production volume products while the jobbing foundry
concentrates on producing a large variety of smaller
quantity, "custom" castings. Both types of foundries can be
further categorized as "jobbing" or "captive" foundries.
These distinctions are used to describe whether the castings
produced are used by external customers (jobbing production)
or by the foundry itself (captive production) . These
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distinctions are often at the root of the differences in
various industry census statistics. Jobbing foundries
constitute the vast majority (over 80%) of the domestic
foundry base. Over 96% of all foundries in the United
States employ 500 or fewer workers. [Ref. 26 :p. 2] This
employment statistic defines these foundries as small
businesses according to Part 19 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR). [Ref. 29:p. 19.6-1]
Approximately 60% of the domestic foundry industry
now casts primarily with nonferrous metals. [Ref. 26: p. 2]
These nonferrous foundries are particulary critical to DOD
and produce castings which have widespread applications in
weapon systems-particulary in aerospace systems. These
nonferrous foundries cast primarily with aluminum and have
been operating at above 70% of capacity since the early
1980 's. [Ref. 30:p. 1] This average operating capacity
statistic is important because it indicates that the
nonferrous foundry (cast aluminum) segment of the industry
is utilizing most of its available capacity. This suggests
that DOD demand for castings has to "compete" with strong
commercial demand for the available capacity. As discussed
earlier in this chapter, commercial demand is often
perceived to be more "attractive" than DOD demand. As a
consequence of this perception, any decline in capacity has
the effect of "squeezing out" DOD demand as commercial
demand utilizes available capacity. Figure 2-3 presents a
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summary analysis of the foundry industry broken down by
employment, cast metal type and production usage.
ANALYSIS OF THE
FOUNDRY INDUSTRY
(NumtDer of plants, US andCanada)
BY EMPLOYMENT-
1986 1983 1980 1978 1975 1973 1971
Over 1.0C0 23 29 52 46 61 53 49
500 to 999 61 57 73 70 83 77 73
250 to 499 145 180 224 222 232 218 210
I00to249 513 572 619 634 628 614 606
50 to 99 619 655 702 701 721 715 711
20to49 982 1,039 1.074 1.148 1.109 1.128 1.169
Under 20 1.562 1.827 1.901 2.008 2.104 2.266 2.436
BY MAJOR METAL CAST:
Gray and ductile iron 1.053 1.165 1.343 1,414 1.452 1.497 1.530
MaiieaDie iron 30 42 53 55 62 65 70
Steel 455 500 490 404 457 437 427
Nonferrous metals 2.458 2,653 2.759 2.866 2.967 3.072 3 227
BY JOBBING-CAPTIVE:
Exclusively lOSbing : 2,585 2.750 2.925 3.025 3.342 3.417 3.494
Primarily jODCing 1 634 717 729 762 532 512 500
Exclusively caotive i 454 504 590 635 659 721 815
Primarily captive I 332 389 401 407 405 421 445
ALL PLANTS: 4.00« 4,360
I
4,645 4,829 4,938 5,071 1 5,2S4
Source: "Metalcasting Industry Census Guide," Foundry
Management and Technology . April 1987.
Figure 2-3 AN ANALYSIS OF THE FOUNDRY INDUSTRY
Casting as a manufacturing process has many
advantages over other forms of metal forming including the
large variety of complex shapes with high dimensional
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accuracy which can be produced. Castings are produced in a
manufacturing process "...by which liquid metal is poured or
injected into a mold cavity, allowed to cool and solidify,
and then released from the mold for finishing and use."
[Ref. 27: p. 1] Castings are widely used because of the
options they afford the manufacturer in terms of product
size, complexity of design, metal content, surface finish
and near-net shape. There are seven basic casting
processes:
- sand casting
- shell mold casting
- plaster mold casting
- investment casting
- permanent mold casting
- centrifugal casting, and
- die casting.
Three of these processes are particulary important to DOD
applications and are briefly described below,
a. Sand Casting
Sand casting is the simplest and most widely
used process accounting for more than 90% of all castings
produced. Essentially, it consists of forming a cavity in
special sand compounds with a pattern, filling the cavity
with liquid metal, allowing it to cool and then breaking
away or "shaking out" the sand. This process is
inexpensive, can be used for large, heavy castings such as
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construction fittings and tank components but is less
dimensionally accurate than other methods.
b. Investment Casting
Investment casting is also known as the "lost-
wax process" and uses wax or plastic injected into a metal
die to form a pattern. The pattern is surrounded by
refractory material. When liquid metal is poured into these
patterns, the wax or plastic melts and is "lost." Liquid
metal fills the remaining cavity. Extremely complex
castings can be produced using this process with great
precision and dimensional accuracy. Any metal type can be
used in this process and castings up to a size of
approximately ten pounds can be made. Common commercial
products include scientific instruments, computer parts,
jewelry. Many aerospace castings are manufactured out of
non-ferrous metals using this process.
c. Die Casting
Die casting is a process where liquid metal is
forced, under high pressure, into a metal die cavity. The
metal is held under pressure until it solidifies, then the
die is opened and the casting ejected from it. This process
is extremely quick, and results in a near-net shape casting
requiring little finishing. Die castings can be produced
with great dimensional accuracy but are usually limited to
non-ferrous metals and a ten pound maximum size. Commercial
products include aluminum transmission cases and aircraft
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parts. A wide variety of DOD cast products are produced
this way. [Ref. 27: pp. 2-3]
The foundry industry is repeatedly identified in
the literature (along with the forging, semi-conductor,
machine tool and bearing industries) as critical to the DIB
and a potential industrial bottleneck. [Ref. 17:pp. 39-52]
Numerous domestic and international pressures have caused a
major restructuring of the industry during the last two
decades. The next section of this chapter will explore the
magnitude of this restructuring and the most significant
factors causing it.
3 . Current Problems and Issues
The foundry industry is a large, diverse, lower tier
industry in the DIB. Because of the pervasive use of
casting products as components in finished goods, "...the
health of the industry is closely aligned with the general
state of the economy." [Ref. 27 :p. xiii] Its performance
over the last ten years has not been up to historic levels
and there is widespread concern that its competitive
position in both domestic and foreign markets is eroding.
[Ref. 27 :p. xiii] The industry suffered a significant
downturn in numbers of firms and in capacity during this
period and many policymakers are concerned over the effect
this will have on the DIB. Policymakers have are concerned
because castings tend to be "bottleneck" items with long
leadtimes. [Ref. l:p. 5-1] This is particulary true when
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one considers the complex, highly specialized nature of the
cast parts usually required by DOD. Many foundries are sole
source suppliers of critical defense castings and the
significant decline in the total number of foundries in the
last two decades has dramatically reduced the number of
potential suppliers. Titech, a company specializing in
precision titanium castings is one such example. It is the
sole source supplier of the wings for the Sparrow missile.
[Ref. l:p. 5-7] More importantly, it is one of only three
titanium casters left in the United States. [Ref. l:p. 5-
15]
The DOD consumes at least ten percent of the total
annual domestic production of castings for weapon and
logistics systems. [Ref. 28 :p. 1] For investment castings,
DOD consumes an astonishing 42% of total annual output.
[Ref. 31 :p. 3] The use of castings throughout DOD is
pervasive and general applications of castings in defense
systems are used for
...engine and engine components, powertrain components,
structural components and some armament components.
Examples of Army products reliant on castings are tanks,
trucks and artillery. The Navy utilizes castings, for
example, in submarines for critical hull and machinery
applications, such a diving, propulsion and weapon
handling systems. Navy surface ships also require
castings in the hull, power, and armament systems.
Aircraft in all services use castings in the fuselage as
well as in engine accessories. Castings are also used in
missiles, bombs, artillery, and small arm components.
Besides their front-line role, castings are essential
components of defense production equipment and logistics
systems. [Ref. 32:p. 14]
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Specific examples of current weapon systems heavily
dependent on nonferrous state-of-the-art casting products
are: [Ref. 33:p. 557]
- the U.S. Navy Phalanx Gun mount and housing,
- the Harpoon Missile Torpedo nosecone,
- the Advanced Lightweight Torpedo body,
- the Air Launched Cruise Missile fuselage, and
- any modern combat aircraft.
Given the importance of the casting industry and its
products to the DOD, it is particulary disturbing to study
the various conclusions on the health of the industry.
Roderick Vawter concluded in a December 1986
National Defense University study entitled, "U.S. Industrial
Base Dependence/Vulnerability," that the overall capacity
and competitiveness of the foundry industry was declining.
[Ref. 17 :p. 50] Between the period of 1979 to 1983,
shipments were down 38%, sales down 21% and employment down
40%. Profits declined from $1.6 billion in 1979 to a $527
million loss in 1983. [Ref. 17 :p. 50] While some segments
of the industry did better than others during this
recessionary period, constant dollar sales for the entire
casting industry declined by nearly 40% during the period of
1972 to 1982. [Ref. l:p. 5-8] James A. Mallory, Executive
Director of the Nonferrous Founders Society and Bob Rodgers,
editor of Foundry Management and Technolocry magazine both
told this researcher that there has been a 20% decline in
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the numbers of domestic nonferrous foundries in the last ten
years and that 15% to 18% of overall capacity has been lost.
[Refs. 34,35]
For various reasons substantial numbers of foundries
are exiting the domestic market. A
...review of publicized foundry closings in the trade
press as well as data supplied by foundry industry trade
associations reveals that from January 1, 1981 to December
31, 1984, 612 ferrous and nonferrous foundries, about 14
percent of the total number of foundries, were shut down.
Although no capacity data are available for these
foundries, employment data indicate that most were in the
medium to small category. For instance, only 3 closed
foundries had more than 2,500 employees, and 13 had 250-
499 employees. The remaining closed foundries had less
than 250 employees. [Ref. 18:p. 32]
Tables 2-3 and 2-4 are an analysis of foundry closings by
employment size and by type of metal cast using the Ladehoff
data. The decline in absolute numbers of domestic foundries
is even more dramatic for the period 1955 to 1980. Figure
2-4 illustrates the 25 year decline in this basic industry.
Vawter believes the decline in this fifth largest
manufacturing industry is due to the fact that the industry
has not been "...cost competitive with foreign producers, in
terms of labor, capital, exchange rates, cost of tooling and
patterns and government regulations affecting cost." [Ref.
17: p. 51] Examples of costly Government regulations include
the strict enforcement of various EPA and OSHA regulations.
There is a widespread belief that enforcement of these
regulations has contributed to the economic factors
"...forcing a large number of foundries to close." [Ref. 1:
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TABLE 2-3
NUMBER OF FOUNDRY CLOSINGS BY TYPE OF METALS CAST
JANUARY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 31, 1984
NONFERROUS
Aluminum 130










Source: Laderhoff, "Restructuring A Changing Industry,"
Foundry Management and Technology . 1985.
TABLE 2-4
FOUNDRY CLOSINGS BASED ON EMPLOYMENT SIZE
JANUARY 1, 1981 TO DECEMBER 3, 1984

































612 100 4256 100
Source: Laderhoff, "Restructuring A Changing Industry,"
Foundry Management and Technology . 1985.
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1955 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71
I I I I I I I
73 75 77 78 80
Source: GAO, "Potential Impediments of Foundry Capacity
Relative to National Defense Needs," EMD-81-134,
September 15, 19 81.
Figure 2-4 TRENDS IN THE NUMBER AND SIZE OF FOUNDRIES
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p. 5-8] Other causes of competitive disadvantages include
foreign government subsidization of domestic foundries,
foreign trade and regulatory barriers. Unfavorable domestic
capital formation and taxation policies are repeatedly cited
as "sharply" discouraging capital investment and interfering
with our ability to compete internationally. [Ref. 28:pp.
12-13]
American foundries are increasingly less efficient
and technologically innovative relative to its foreign
competitors, such as Japan. High levels of technical
efficiency have been achieved by German, British and
Japanese competitors due to higher levels of capital
investment and more favorable tax policies. These factors
have created a significant price advantage for Japanese
castings. Foundrv Management and Technoloav estimates that
2 0% percent of the Japanese price advantage is due solely to
their capital investments in more efficient casting
technologies. [Ref. 31: p. 8] In addition to competing with
highly efficient foundries such as the Japanese, American
foundries are increasingly competing with nations such as
Brazil, India, and China who have used protectionist trade
polices and cheap labor costs to penetrate the American
market with simple, mass produced castings. Import
penetration, according to the American Cast Metals
Association,
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. . .has been and is expected to continue to be most
significant in the area of standardized, simple-to-
manufacture, price sensitive castings, such as iron
construction castings, fittings and valves. [Ref. 28 :p.
9]
The importation and "alleged" dumping of cast products from
these countries has been the subject of at least one
petition with the International Trade Commission (ITC) by
industry associations requesting that tariffs be placed on
these types of cast products. However, the petitions were
not supported by the ITC and the tariffs were never enacted
by the president. [Ref. 37:p. 19-8]
The magnitude of import penetration is hard to gauge
and has been officially estimated at three percent of the
U.S. market. However these figures do not account for the
castings entering the U.S. under other classifications such
as finished products, components and as parts of finished
products. [Ref. 36:p. 10] The increasing importation of
finished assemblies and manufactured goods containing
castings represent lost production for U.S. foundries and
may have a greater potential impact on domestic foundries
than the importation of castings themselves. [Ref. 27: p.
20]
A significant decrease in domestic demand for
castings has also affected the foundry base. Major
industrial consumers of castings such as the auto and
machine tool industries have been restructuring due to their
own international competition as well as other factors. The
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drop in demand for domestic autos, machine tools and other
finished goods has created a tremendous decline in demand
for cast parts. Fewer and lighter castings are now being
used in all finished goods and materials such as plastics
are being increasingly substituted for formerly cast metal
parts
.
F. FOUNDRY INDUSTRY SUMMARY
Increasing supply, and decreasing demand, combined with
intense international competition, unfavorable domestic tax
policies and regulatory costs, have forced substantial
numbers of foundries out of the domestic base reducing its
capacity and capabilities. Increasing numbers of the
remaining firms are "sourcing-out" remaining production
overseas. [Ref. 28 :p. 11] These factors have created well-
founded concern over the ability of the lower tier domestic
(particularly nonferrous) foundry base to support upper tier
prime contractors in the DIB. These concerns are founded
primarily on the huge "bottleneck" effect a few critical
foundries could have on a large number of DIB contractors.
Individually, each of these economic and political factors
is manageable; collectively, these factors create powerful
forces which, in the opinion of the researcher, will
continue to drive foundries out of the lower tiers of the
DIB. In the opinion of the researcher, the remaining
foundry base, when given the choice between commercial
ventures and Government related business, will almost always
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choose the more attractive commercial ventures. This is
particularly true for our domestic nonferrous foundries
which are already operating at nearly full capacity. The
foundries that do stay in DOD subcontract work probably do
so because the exit barriers from that market are too high.
This situation will have the effect of creating a limited
number of foundries with the capital, equipment and
technical capabilities to successfully produce high quality
DOD castings. This will occur in much the same way that the
relatively few, large prime contractors such as Lockheed,
Hughes, FMC and Electric Boat, gradually found themselves in
a market they could not exit, and that the Government found
it could not substantially expand.
Given the significant forces causing foundries to
exit the domestic market and the critical importance of the
foundry industry to the DIB, it becomes essential to the DIB
planner to understand the capacity, capabilities and
motivations of the foundries left in the base. Earlier in
this chapter, evidence was presented from Dr. David V. Lamm
that 2 0% of the businesses he surveyed intended to get out,
or stay out, of doing business with the Government. If this
research finding is valid, another fifth of our diminishing
domestic foundry base could potentially be refusing (or
intending to refuse) to accept such business. Because of
this potential, the researcher decided to target the foundry
industry for a more detailed study on these attitudes
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towards doing business with the Government. Nonferrous
foundries were specifically targeted for this research due
to the widespread use of its cast products by prime
contractors in critical, state-of-the-art weapon systems. A
secondary benefit of studying the foundry industry as
opposed to other critical industries previously identified
was the fact the almost all of the domestic foundry base is
composed of small businesses in the little studied lower
tiers of the DIB. The next chapter in this study presents
the research methodology used in the researcher's attempt to
answer the primary and subsidiary research questions
concerning foundry industry attitudes on doing Government
business.
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III. SURVEY BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Throughout this study, the researcher has stated that
continued concern over the erosion of the Defense Industrial
Base (DIB) has resulted in numerous studies to determine its
extent and causes. In Chapter II the researcher cited
literature which strongly suggested that the problems
causing the DIB to erode at the prime contractor level are
probably more acute at the supporting lower tier
subcontractor level. Yet, a thorough research of the
current literature provided little objective data on the
actual economic and productive health of those lower tier
subcontractors. Virtually no current data could be found on
foundry industry subcontractors.
General statements indicating subcontractors are exiting
the defense marketplace (creating longer leadtimes, higher
costs and potential industrial bottlenecks) , are made but
not sufficiently substantiated. Given that approximately
50% to 70% of our "eroding" DIB is composed of subcontrac-
tors, and that over half of all procurement dollars are
spent at the subcontractor level, what are the extent and
reasons for this hypothesized erosion at the subcontractor
tier level? What specifically is causing foundries to drop
out of the DIB and not participate in DOD business? How
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significant and widespread is the problem? This chapter
explains the survey methodology and the rationale for the
survey questions asked in the attempt to answer these
questions.
B. SURVEY DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY
The focus of this research was on subcontractors who
refuse to participate in DOD business. The primary research
objective was to determine the extent of this refusal and
the most significant reasons for it. The researcher had to
narrow the scope of this effort to an industry which was
essential to the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) and could be
expected to be composed primarily of subcontractors.
Because of these requirements, the nonferrous foundry
industry was chosen for the survey methodology employed by
the researcher.
A 42 question survey was used to determine whether
significant numbers of foundry subcontractors were
contributing to the erosion of the DIB base by refusing, or
intending to refuse, to participate in DOD business. The
survey had five overall objectives:
1. to obtain descriptive data on the domestic nonferrous
foundry base,
2. to target, through the use of "filters" in the survey,
only those nonferrous foundries that were subcontrac-
tors and possessed the attitude that they were going
to stay out or get out of DOD business,
3. to determine the relative importance of various




to determine the most important reason for staying out
or getting out of DOD business, and
5. to determine under what conditions a foundry would
consider getting back in to DOD business.
In order to elicit candid, honest answers and to improve the
survey return rate, respondents were informed that all
responses were confidential and would be used on a strictly
non-attribution basis. A cover letter from the American
Foundryman Society and from the researcher emphasizing the
confidential nature of the survey, its objectives and goals
accompanied each survey. The entire survey and its cover
letter is contained in Appendix B.
The overriding consideration in the development of the
survey was to obtain data which would answer the primary and
subsidiary research questions from a foundry subcontractor's
point of view. During the development of the survey a
significant effort was put into using close ended questions
that would have a single "best" answer which the respondent
could simply choose from a range of possibilities. With
some of the questions this was not possible, but these were
kept to a minimum and were generally descriptive in nature.
A "chunk survey" methodology was used to survey the
targeted nonferrous foundry population. A chunk survey
looks at a convenient slice of a population. It is really
an investigation carried out by a researcher on a specific
class of a population which fits a particular description or
set of requirements. A chunk survey is dependent upon
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I
finding respondents who fit the requirements and who are
willing to answer the survey questions. Because the
foundries surveyed were not chosen using a random sampling
procedure, probabilistic conclusions can not be made about
the data obtained. Although a random sample is much more
desireable, useful results can be obtained from chunk
surveys "...particularly in the arts of questioning and
interviewing...." [Ref. 38:pp. 14-15]
Numerous Government and commercial databases were
examined in order to obtain a significant sample size from
this nonferrous foundry population to survey. Four data-
bases were examined in detail in an attempt to obtain survey
candidates. These databases were the: 1) PASS (Procurement
Automated Source System) database maintained by the Small
Business Administration, 2) DINET Defense Industrial
Network database maintained by the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) , 3) Dun and Bradstreet Market Services
commercial database, and 4) American Foundrymen ' s Society
membership database. These databases were used to develop a
survey candidate mailing list of 1,326 nonferrous foundries.
The initial survey list of 1,326 foundries represented
approximately 65% to 108% (all percentages have been rounded
to the nearest whole percent) of the total nonferrous
foundries in the United States, depending on which
population data were used! The wide range in the estimated
percentage of the total population surveyed was due to the
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fact that throughout this research effort, a single,
authoritative foundry population census could not be found.
Estimates of the total number of domestic nonferrous
foundries ranged from the high Nonferrous Founders
Association estimate of approximately 2,000 to the low DINET
estimate of 1,231. Dun and Bradstreet Market Services lists
1,952 and the American Foundrymen's Society lists
approximately 1,500 nonferrous foundries. The wide range in
these census figures was attributed to lack of consistent
data collection and the use of differing definitions as to
what constitutes a particular type of foundry. These
definitional issues were previously discussed in Chapter II.
After analyzing all the data, the researcher concluded that
the American Foundrymen's Society estimate of 1,500
foundries appeared to be the most accurate. It also was the
most consistent in size relative to other data (such as
total domestic foundry output/capacity) analyzed by the
researcher. Using a baseline of 1,500 foundries from the
American Foundrymen's Society database, the researcher
estimated that approximately 88% of domestic nonferrous
foundries were included in this survey. A survey sample
size of approximately 88% of the total domestic nonferrous
foundry base was considered to be of sufficient size to
provide meaningful data for analysis. The actual survey
mailing list was developed from data extracted from the
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PASS, Dun and Bradstreet and American Foundrymen ' s Society
databases.
Of the initial 1,326 surveys mailed, 27 were eventually
returned as undeliverable and five were returned because the
addressee was no longer in the foundry business. This left
1,294 potential respondents to the survey. A one month
survey return period was used as a cutoff point after which
data analysis would begin. During the one month return
period 244 surveys were received for an overall return rate
of 19% (244/1294) . For a "blind" survey mailing, this
return rate was considered acceptable for the purposes of
this researcher. Eighteen surveys were returned after the
one month cutoff period and were not used in this analysis.
The survey methodology employed two critical "filters"
to identify foundry subcontractors who refused, or intended
to refuse, to participate in DOD business. Of the 244
surveys which were returned in time for analysis, 196 (80%)
did not pass these filters and 48 (20%) did. These survey
"filters" are discussed in detail later in this chapter.
The individual answers provided by the survey
respondents in each of these two groups was recorded and
stored in the form of data vectors in "no-pass filter" and
"pass filter" data files. The collective data vectors
formed data matrices which were then analyzed using an IBM
programming language known as APL-A Programming Language,
and an IBM statistical analysis program known as GRAFSTAT.
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When used together, APL and GRAFSTAT can provide the
researcher with powerful graphical tools to organize and
analyze large data sets. The graphical analysis of the
survey data that follows was the result of using APL and
GRAFSTAT to analyze the survey data obtained.
C. THE SURVEY QUESTIONS
The survey began with the following explanatory
introduction
:
This survey is designed to solicit your ideas and concerns
about Department of Defense (DOD) procurement policies and
procedures at the subcontractor level. The goal of the
survey is to determine why firms do not desire to
participate in DOD business at the subcontractor level.
Please take a few minutes of your time to give us your
honest answers to these survey questions. You may remain
anonymous if you wish. All answers will remain
confidential and will only be used for research analysis.
Please circle one answer per question which best describes
your situation or answer in the space provided. Thank you
for your assistance.
This introduction was designed to emphasize the purpose and
confidentiality of the survey and to instruct the respondent
to choose one best answer to each appropriate question.
The survey questions are presented below along with the
rationale for asking each of them. Questions one and two
required subjective, narrative responses. Question one was
asked to verify that the respondent was from the nonferrous
foundry industry. Question two was asked in order to obtain
examples of the commercial and DOD uses of an individual
foundry's cast products. Question two was also asked to
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gauge the awareness of individual foundries to the DOD uses
of their products. Questions one and two were:
1. Please briefly describe your primary cast products:
2
.
Please describe the commercial and/or DOD uses for
your primary cast products: (if known)
Question three tried to determine whether or not the
respondent knew what its Standard Industrial Classification
code (SIC) was. This was asked because numerous databases
are organized around individual SICs.
3. My primary Standard Industrial Classification code
(SIC) is:
Questions four through eight were designed to collect basic
demographic information about the survey respondents. This
information was intended to test some of the assumptions
made by the researcher concerning the "small business"
nature of the foundry industry.
4. What casting process do you primarily use?
5. What metal/alloy type do you primarily cast with?
6. Please indicate your approximate number of employees.
7. Is your company affiliated through ownership with
other companies?
8. If you answered yes to question 7, please indicate the
total employment of your company and your affiliated
companies.
Question nine was the first of two occasions the survey
respondent would have to describe his foundry business as
primarily subcontract work for other contractors. A
response of one or two (exclusively or primarily jobbing)
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was interpreted by the researcher to mean that the
respondent was primarily a subcontractor.
9. Which of the following best describes your foundry
business?
Question ten was a second attempt to gauge awareness of the
potential DOD uses of a particular foundry's cast products.
It was also asked to facilitate data analysis based on
discriminating between foundries that have specific, known
DOD uses for their products and foundries that do not.
10. If you answered #1 or #2 in question 9, are the firms
you sell to/subcontract with involved in Department of
Defense business?
Questions 11 and 12 were designed to obtain sales data on
the survey respondent and to further test the researcher's
assumptions concerning the "small business" nature of the
foundry industry.
11. What percentage of your sales go to? (area)
12. What is the approximate total annual sales volume of
your company?
Question 13 was the first filter used in the survey.
This filter was used to discriminate between prime
contractors and subcontractors based on the researcher's
"50% or more of total sales...." criterion. It was also the
second time a foundry could identify itself as acting
primarily as a subcontractor in its industry. This filter
was designed to complement question nine and was expected to
reduce the number of respondents continuing with the survey.
The filter was considered essential to test the researcher's
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assumptions and to target the desired research population of
lower tier subcontractors.




IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO QUESTION 13, PLEASE STOP AND RETURN
THIS SURVEY USING THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOR
YOUR TIME AND EFFORT.
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 13, PLEASE CONTINUE THE
SURVEY
.
The following definition was provided in the survey for the
subcontractors that passed the first filter:
DEFINITION ; In this study "Defense" procurement, business
and contracting all refer to sales of materials or
services to the Department of Defense. These sales may be
direct to the government, while acting as a prime
contractor for the Department of Defense, or indirect,
when a subcontractor sells to a prime contractor who is
doing business with the government.
The following instructions were then given concerning a
second filter :
Using the above definition of defense business, please
consider the following statements concerning DOD business:
#1. I currently participate in DOD business but intend to
get out of it .
#2. I currently do not have any DOD business and intend
to stay out of it.
14
.
Do either of the above statements describe your
attitude concerning DOD business?
1. Yes
2. No
IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO QUESTION 14, PLEASE STOP AND RETURN
THIS SURVEY USING THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOR
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TIME AND EFFORT. IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 14,
PLEASE CONTINUE THE SURVEY.
This second, critical filter was designed to specifically
focus on those subcontractors who refuse, or intend to
refuse, DOD business. The survey population remaining after
these two filters would provide the data to answer the
primary and subsidiary research questions using the
remaining survey questions.
Question 15 was designed to discriminate between two
hypothetical subcontractor foundry populations: those
foundries that never accepted DOD business, or used to in
the past but do not now, and those foundries currently in
DOD business, but intending to get out. The responses
obtained from this question would provide a wealth of non-
probabilistic data on the attitudes and business intentions
of foundries out of or exiting the DIB. /
15. Which of the statements listed above concerning DOD
business best describes your situation?
1. I'm IN DOD business but intend to GET OUT
2. I'm OUT of DOD business and intend to STAY OUT.
In order to discriminate further between the get out and
stay out populations, the following questions were asked to
obtain more data on the stay out population's previous
experiences with DOD business. The following instructions
and questions were given/asked:
IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER #1 ABOVE, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 18.
IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER #2 ABOVE, PLEASE CONTINUE.
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16. If you do not currently participate in DOD business,
which of the following best describes your DOD
business experience?
1. We have never tried making sales to the
government
.




We have made such sales in the past but do not
now.
17. If you were involved in DOD business in the past but
are not now, how long ago were you involved in DOD
business?
The rest of the survey dealt specifically with the
reasons a subcontractor foundry had for refusing or
intending to refuse to participate in DOD business. Twenty-
two specific reasons gleaned from the available research
literature were provided for the respondent to review and
scale for importance. An "other" response was also provided
to capture unique/unforeseen reasons. The respondent was
instructed to answer each question. This was done in
conjunction with a response scale to facilitate data
analysis focusing on the relative and absolute importance of
each reason to the respondent. The following instructions
were provided:
Please carefully review all of the following reasons for
not participating in DOD business. After reviewing all of
the reasons, please indicate the importance of each reason
to your decision to get out of DOD business or to stay out
of DOD business. Please use the following response scale
for each question:
1 = not important at all to my decision
2 = somewhat important to my decision
3 = important to my decision
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4 = very important to my decision
5 = the most important reason for my decision.
My/our company does not participate in, or intends to stop
participating in, DOD business because of:
18. prime contractor late payment or non-payment of bills.
19. burdensome paperwork requirements.
20. prime contractor contract flow-down requirements.
21. adversarial government/prime contractor relationships.
22. adversarial prime/sub contractor relationships.
23. uncertainty/instability of government business base.
24. low profitability/lost money on government related
subcontracts
.
25. prime contractor/higher level subcontractor contract-
ing methods/policies on DOD related business.
26. we don't know how to obtain government subcontracts.
27. government/prime contractor auditing requirements/
procedures.
28. inconsistent quality requirements.
29. overly restrictive (too high) quality standards.
30. acceptance/rejection problems with my product.
31. inflexible government procurement methods/policies.
32. delays in making awards/ frequent contract changes.
33. inefficient production levels/rates.
34. we have heard too many "horror" stories about DOD
business.
35. more attractive commercial sales to non-DOD prime
contractors.
36. do not have production capability/capacity to accept
government work.
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37. government will not let me use my normal foreign
sources of supply for production materials/
requirements
.
38. lost DOD subcontract business to other competitors.
39. previous contract (s) terminated.
40. other reason (s)
.
The last two questions of the survey were designed to help
the respondent discriminate between the most important
reasons a respondent had for refusing or intending to refuse
to participate in DOD business.
41. Of all the reasons listed in questions 18 through 40,
what is the one reason you consider the most important
to your decision to not participate in DOD business?
Please explain, perhaps with an example, the specifics
of your choice.
Question 41 attempted this by asking the respondent to
choose and subjectively describe a single most important
reason for his decision to not participate in DOD business.
This was done to discriminate between multiple responses of
five on the reasons provided. Question 42 was designed to
approach this discrimination process from the opposite
perspective: what conditions would have to change in order
to motivate the subcontractor to stay in or get into, DOD
business. It was assumed by the researcher that the answers
to questions 41 and 42 would focus on similar reasons/
concerns. By asking both questions, the researcher hoped a
broader perspective would be obtained on the most important
reasons/motivations of these foundry subcontractors
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refusing, or intending to refuse, to participate in DOD
business.
42. Under what conditions would you consider getting into
DOD business or staying in DOD business? Please
comment
:
Even though the survey was conducted on a strictly
confidential basis to encourage candid answers and to
increase the return rate, an opportunity was provided for
the respondent to identify himself and indicate if he was
willing to be interviewed.
43. I am willing to discuss my views by:
a. phone: yes no





Phone : i }_
D. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an in-depth overview of the
background, methodology and development of the survey
questionnaire used. The rationale for each question used
was presented. Chapter IV will present and analyze the data
generated by the survey.
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IV. AN ANALYSIS OF WHY FOUNDRIES REFUSE POD BUSINESS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter introduced the reader to the survey
objectives and methodology. This chapter presents the data
that was obtained from the survey and analyzes the reasons
why nonferrous foundry subcontractors refuse to participate
in DOD business. Various subsets of the survey population
are studied and the results of hypothesis tests are
presented. The chapter concludes with a presentation of the
most significant reasons foundry subcontractors have for not
participating in DOD business.
B. ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY RESPONSES
Of the 244 survey responses received and analyzed, three
distinct populations subsets appeared in the data as a
result of the survey filters used. The first and largest of
these three subsets consisted of 123 firms (50%) which
represented fiinns that did not identify themselves as
subcontractors (answered no to question 13) . The next
subset consisted of 73 firms (30%) which represented firms
identifying themselves as subcontractors that intended to
participate in DOD business (answered yes to question 13 and
no to question 14) . The final subset consisted of 48 firms
(20%) which represented subcontractors who refuse, or intend
to refuse, to participate in DOD business (answered yes to
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yes to question 13 and yes to question 14) . A graphical
representation of this survey universe is presented in
Figure 4-1. The data analysis that follows begins with a
demographic analysis of the entire survey universe and then
focuses on an analysis of the refusal reasons of the 48
firms which passed both filters. The data analysis
concludes with explanatory factor hypothesis tests.
1. Demographic Analysis
Questions one and two asked the respondent to
describe his cast products and their known uses. Cast
product descriptions and uses were provided by all the
respondents and ranged from plumbing fixtures to castings
used in the NASA space shuttle. Numerous DOD cast products
were described and included parts for combat aircraft, tank
and armored vehicles, submarines and ships. Virtually all
of these products were used as piece parts or components in
larger assemblies integrated by larger prime contractors.
Question three asked for the Standard Industrial
Classification code (SIC) of the firm. This question was
left blank, or incorrectly filled in by the vast majority of
the survey respondents. This supported a common observation
that most commercial firms do not know their SIC is (or for
that matter, appear to care)
.
Questions four and five asked for information
concerning the casting process and the metal/alloy type







































































































































































responses to these two questions. In Figure 4-2 the
following casting process choices were used:
1. investment casting (invest)
,
2. die casting (die),
3. sand casting (sand),
4
.
permanent mold casting (perm) , and
5. other castings processes (other).
In Figure 4-3 the following metal/alloy type choices were
used:
1. aluminum alloys (alum),
2. nickel based alloys (nickel),
3. magnesium alloys (magn)
,
4. zinc alloys (zinc),
5. titanium (titan),
6. cobalt (cobal) , and
7. other alloys (other).
The survey responses are separated into "NON-DOD,"
"DOD" and "TOTAL" groups. These groups correspond to NON-
DOD contractors that passed both survey filters (NON-DOD =
do not want to participate in DOD business) , DOD contractors
that did not pass both filters (DOD = want to participate in
DOD business) , and all survey respondents (TOTAL POPULATION
= DOD + NON-DOD) . Inspection of these data indicated that
sand and die casting processes using aluminum were
overwhelming used by both NON-DOD and DOD contractors. This
was expected by the researcher because sand casting is the
80
most commonly used casting process for cost and technical
reasons and aluminum is the most widely used "white" metal
in nonferrous foundries.
Question six asked for the approximate number of
employees. Figure 4-4 illustrates the survey responses
using the same DOD and NON-DOD groupings previously
described. The survey respondents are overwhelmingly small
businesses employing 500 or fewer employees. As previously
discussed, the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) defined
a small business in the foundry industry as a foundry
employing 500 persons or less. These survey data supported
the researcher's assumption that a majority of the
nonferrous foundries would be small businesses. Looking at
the data presented in Figure 4-4 it appeared that DOD
contractors are slightly larger than NON-DOD contractors but
were still overwhelmingly small businesses.
Questions seven and eight asked if the survey
respondent was affiliated through ownership with other
companies and, if so, what was their total employment.
Approximately 75% of both the NON-DOD and DOD respondents
were not affiliated through ownership with other companies.
Of the remaining 25% that were affiliated, more than half
were still small businesses based on employment figures.
Figure 4-5 illustrates these combined data.
Question nine asked the survey respondent to
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products produced. This question was asked in order to
allow the survey respondent to characterize his business as
either a jobbing foundry or a captive foundry. A jobbing
foundry was previously described as a subcontract producer
while a captive foundry was described as a prime contract
producer. The survey responses to this question were
important due to this self-characterization process. One of
the requirements for the research population was that the
individual firms within that research population identify
themselves as subcontractors. The researcher also assumed
that a majority of the firms in the foundry industry would
be subcontractors due to the nature of the products they
produce and their relatively small sizes. The responses to
question nine are illustrated in Figure 4-6. The Figure 4-6
self-characterization choices were:
1. exclusively jobbing (all job)
2. primarily jobbing (pri job)
3. exclusively captive (all cap)
4. primarily captive (pri cap)
5. other (other).
As the reader can see, the vast majority of both NON-DOD and
DOD contractors identified themselves as exclusively or
primarily jobbing foundries. The researcher interpreted
this to mean that they are primarily subcontractors.
Question 10 asked survey respondents that identified

































whether or not they knew if the firms they sold to/subcon-
tract with were involved in DOD business. Sixty —three
percent of the DOD contractors and 77% of the NON-DOD
contractors indicated the firms they sold to were involved
in DOD business. These data suggest that the majority of
NON-DOD foundries (foundries that do not want to participate
in DOD business) produce cast products which could be/are
used by DOD prime contractors in military weapon systems.
Refusal of these particular firms to participate in DOD
business is therefore even more significant.
Question 11 asked the respondent to describe the
majority of his sales by geographic location. Both NON-DOD
and DOD contractors conducted the majority of their sales
with local customers (within 100 mile radius) with less
significant sales to regional and national customers. Only
DOD contractors reported any foreign (OUTUS) sales. Figure
4-7 depicts these data.
Question 12 asked for approximate total annual
sales. This question was included in order to complement
the earlier question on business size based on number of
employees. It was assumed by the researcher that the
majority of foundries surveyed would have relatively low
total annual sales figures due to the small size of these
businesses. The data presented in Figure 4-8 support these
assumptions with the majority of both NON-DOD and DOD firms














































































































data are important because, along with employee size and
company affiliation, they suggest that the extremely small
"mom and pop" type foundry may exist more in fact than
fiction. They also suggest that the vast majority of these
firms, due to their size, may not have the capital resources
to invest in the capacity and technology required to make
sophisticated DOD castings.
All 244 survey respondents answered (where appropri-
ate) these first 12 survey questions. As stated previously,
these questions were designed to provide basic demographic
data on the survey respondents and to test some of the
researcher's basic assumptions about the foundry industry.
Questions 13 and 14 contained the two previously mentioned
filters designed to identify subcontractors that refuse, or
intend to refuse, to participate in DOD business. An
analysis of the reasons why this group of foundry
subcontractors have this attitude about DOD business
follows.
2 . Refusal Reason Analysis
This chapter segment analyzes the survey responses
to questions 15 through 42. These questions followed the
two survey filters and therefore were answered only by
subcontractors who refuse, or intend to refuse, to
participate in DOD business. The survey data provided by
this population formed the basis for answering the primary
and subsidiary research questions in Chapter V. Of the 244
89
returned surveys, 48 passed both filters. The first filter,
question 13 asked: "Do fifty percent or more of your total
annual sales result from subcontract work?" If the answer
was yes, the respondent continued to question 14, which was
the second filter. Question 14 asked the respondent if
either of the following statements described his attitude
concerning DOD business?
#1. I currently participate in DOD business but intend to
get out of it .
#2. I currently do not have any DOD business and intend
to stay out of it.
If the answer to question 14 was also yes (having passed
both filters) , the respondent would then go on to complete
the remaining 26 survey questions dealing with the reasons
why the firm refused, or intended to refuse, to participate
in DOD business.
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, the
48 survey respondents which passed both filters represented
2 0% of the returned surveys. Seventy three respondents
(30%) passed the first filter but not the second, and the
123 remaining respondents (70%) did not pass either filter.
Question 15 asked the 48 respondents which of the
attitudes in question 14 best described their situation.
Twenty one foundries (44%) indicated that choice #1 (GET
OUT) best described their situation while the other 27
foundries (56%) indicated that choice #2 (STAY OUT) best
described their situation.
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Question 16 asked the 27 STAY OUT respondents to
describe their previous DOD business experience (if any)
.
Eight firms indicated they had never tried making sales to
DOD, eight firms indicated they had tried but never
succeeded in making sales to DOD, and the remaining 11
indicated they had made sales to DOD in the past.
Question 17 asked the STAY OUT respondents from
question 16 that had previous sales to DOD (11 firms) but
did not now, how long ago they sold to DOD. Eight firms
indicated that they had made sales to DOD two or more years
ago with the remaining three firms having made such sales
within the last two years.
Questions 18 through 39 asked the respondent to
review and scale for importance, 22 different reasons for
not participating in DOD business. These 22 refusal reasons
and one optional "other" reason are the heart of the survey
and this research effort. Each potential reason for the
decision to refuse to participate in DOD business was
required to be ranked for importance according to the
following scale:
1. not important at all to my decision,
2. somewhat important to my decision,
3. important to my decision,
4. very important to my decision,
5. the most important reason for my decision.
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By asking the respondent to use this scale on every reason,
the researcher hoped each survey respondent that passed both
filters would carefully review and clearly discriminate
between the relative importance of the various hypothesized
reasons for refusing to participate in DOD business.
Before analyzing the overall responses to the 22
"standard" reasons provided in the survey, the researcher
wanted to determine how discriminating each of the 48 firms
which passed both filters had been in scaling the 22
"standard" reasons. It was assumed that the fewer number of
times that an individual firm used response five, or
responses four and five (the strongest responses) , the
greater the discrimination on the part of the firm between
more important reasons and less important reasons for not
participating in DOD business. Figures 4-9 and 4-10 present
an analysis of the number of times each of the 48 firms used
these responses along with a "mean response value."
Figure 4-9 represents the response distribution for
response five. The reader should note that seven firms did
not use response five at all, and one firm used response
five for all 22 reasons for not participating in DOD
business. Figure 4-10 represents the response distribution
for responses four and five. The reader should note that
only one firm did not use either response four or five on
any of the 22 questions. Both these figures graphically
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consists of more discriminating firms which used these
"stronger" responses fewer times than the average, and those
less discriminating firms which used the "stronger"
responses more times than average.
In both of these figures the data suggest that the
majority of the respondents followed the survey instructions
and strongly discriminated between the relative importance
of each of the 2 2 refusal reasons. Thirty—two firms (67%)
used response five, four or fewer times while scaling all 22
reasons. Thirty firms (63%) used responses four or five,
seven or fewer times while scaling all 22 reasons. Upon
initial review, the researcher thought that comparing the
responses for all 48 firms to the 32 firms that used
response five fewer times than the average would be
beneficial in highlighting the differences in attitudes
between a less discriminating (all 48 firms) group and the
more discriminating (32 firms) group. However, using this
highly discriminating group of 32 firms causes the loss of
data observations for seven firms that did not choose
response five for any of the 22 reasons. Therefore, in the
data analysis that follows, the researcher decided to use
and compare the responses from both a 48 firm (less
discriminating) group and the 3 firm (more discriminating)
group to highlight the differences in their respective
attitudes towards participating in DOD business.
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A statistical analysis was performed using GRAFSTAT
on each of the 22 reasons and the responses received by it.
This analysis included frequency histograms, box and whisker
plots and basic descriptive statistics. These frequency
histograms and basic descriptive statistics for each of the
22 reasons are included in Appendix C. After analyzing the
descriptive statistics and graphical output, the researcher
concluded that response mean of three or greater for any
individual refusal reason was statistically significant.
Figure 4-11 graphically displays the overall (48
firms) response means for each of the 22 refusal reasons in
the form of skyscraper plots. Those plots rising above the
reference line had means of three or greater and median
response values of four. In the researcher's opinion they
represented the most statistically significant reasons for
refusing, or intending to refuse, to participate in DOD
business in this study.
The seven most significant reasons ranked in order
of most to least importance are:
- #31 inflexible government procurement methods/policies
- #19 burdensome paperwork requirements
- #35 more attractive commercial sales to non-DOD prime
contractors
- #29 overly restrictive (too high) quality standards
- #28 inconsistent quality requirements







































































- #2 5 prime contractor/higher level subcontractor
contracting methods/policies on DOD related business.
Figure 4-11 displays a wealth of data which tends to confirm
some of the hypothesized reasons for contractor unwilling-
ness to participate in DOD business that was presented in
Chapter II. These data also substantiate some of the
earlier findings from the Gaffney and Lamm studies on
business attitudes towards participating in DOD business.
Chapter II presented research findings from Gaffney 's
masters thesis that indicated the top five reasons for
refusing to participate in DOD business were:
- Too hard/complicated




The researcher also presented Lamm's study which indicated
the top five reasons for refusing to participate in DOD
business were:
- Burdensome paperwork
- Government bidding methods
- Inflexible bidding methods
- More attractive commercial ventures
- Low profitability.
If the Gaffney survey reason of "Too hard/complicated" can
be interpreted as referring to complex procurement policies
or difficult paperwork requirements, then the top three
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Gaffney survey reasons and all of the top five Lamm survey
reasons are substantiated by these survey results.
Also of importance in Figure 4-11 are those reasons
that stand out as not important to the decision to refuse to
participate in DOD business. The seven least significant
reasons for not participating in DOD business ranked in
order of least to most importance were:
- #37—Government will not let me use my normal foreign
sources of supply for production materials/requirements
- #36—Do not have the production capability/capacity to
accept Government work
- #39—Previous contract (s) terminated
- #38—Lost DOD subcontract business to other competitors
- #22—Adversarial prime/sub contractor relationship
- #2 6—Don't know how to obtain Government subcontracts
- #21—Adversarial Government/prime contractor
relationship.
The researcher was not surprised by the most significant
reasons for not participating in DOD business but was
surprised by some of the least significant reasons.
Production capacity/capability was assumed by the researcher
to be a significant problem for nonferrous foundry
subcontractors. This was assumed because of the
historically high capacity utilization in the industry (well
over 70% as discussed in Chapter II) and the extremely high
quality requirements for DOD castings. The survey respond-
ents may have indirectly addressed these issues when they
indicated that more attractive commercial ventures and
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overly restrictive quality were among the top four reasons
for not participating in DOD business. It was also assumed
that intense price competition at the subcontractor level
was forcing many of these foundries to drop out of the DOD
marketplace. However, reason 38, "lost DOD subcontracts
business to other competitors," did not appear to be a
significant non participation reason. Chapter II
hypothesized that an adversarial prime/sub contractor
relationship and the prime's ability to shift risk with
negative contract flow down clauses was forcing
subcontractors out of the Defense Industrial Base (DIB)
.
Reason 22, "adversarial prime/sub relationships," and reason
39, "previous contract (s) terminated," were used to test
this hypothesis. Both reasons did not appear to be
significant from the results of this study. Finally,
numerous informal comments were received by the researcher
that small businesses do not know how to obtain DOD
contracts. Reason 26, "we don't know how to obtain
Government subcontracts," was included in the survey to
gauge the extent of this problem. Again, this reason did
not appear to be significant to the decision not to
participate in DOD business.
Having briefly analyzed the overall responses of all
48 firms, the researcher then compared two subsets of this
population against each other. It was felt that a better
discrimination between the relative importance of the
100
various reasons for not participating in DOD business would
be obtained from those firms that used the two strongest
responses (four or five) fewer times than the overall
average. As discussed earlier, responses four or five were
used an average of 7.8 times by all 48 firms. Figure 4-12
illustrates the response differences between these two
population subsets: those firms that used response four or
five less than 7.8 times (more discriminating) and those
firms that used response four or five more than 7.8 times
(less discriminating) . The reader should note that the Y
axis is no longer a response mean but the number of four or
five responses. Thirty firms fell into the more
discriminating category and the remaining 18 into the less
discriminating category. As expected, the more discriminat-
ing 30 firms showed greater variability in their responses
than the less discriminating firms. These firms clearly
indicated that reasons 19, 31 and 35 (procurement policy,
commercial sales and paperwork) were significant factors in
their decisions not to participate in DOD business.
Question 15 asked each survey respondent to describe
his attitude towards DOD business as either of the
following:
#1—I'm IN DOD business but intend to GET OUT
#2—I'm OUT of DOD business and intend to STAY OUT.
This created two population subsets among the 4 8 firms that
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the STAY OUT subcontractors . The researcher then tried to
determine if there were any significant differences between
GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractor reasons for not partici-
pating in DOD business. Using responses four and five only,
Figure 4-13 compares the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractor
responses to the responses for all 48 firms. These data
indicate 21 firms (44%) intend to GET OUT of DOD business
and 2 7 firms (56%) intend to STAY OUT of DOD business.
These GET OUT and STAY OUT distinctions are
important because they represent the differences between the
DOD business experiences/attitudes of these two groups of
subcontractors. The GET OUT group is involved with DOD
business now and intends to not participate in the future.
The most significant reasons chosen by this group for not
participating in DOD business represent the reality of their
experiences in today's DOD marketplace. The most
significant reasons chosen by the STAY OUT group for not
participating in future DOD business represent their
perception of what today's DOD marketplace would be like to
work in. The researcher believes that these perceptions
have probably been shaped more by opinion and impression
than recent actual experience. This observation was based
on the analysis of responses to question 16 where the
majority (16 of 27) of the STAY OUT firms indicated they had
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Figure 4-13 provides interesting insights to these
experiential and perceptional differences between STAY OUT
and GET OUT subcontractor reasons for not participating in
DOD business. The five most significant reasons GET OUT
subcontractors have for not wanting to participate in DOD
business were (listed in order of most to least importance)
:
- #31—Inflexible Government procurement methods/policies
- #29—Overly restrictive (too high ) quality standards
- #24—Low profitability/lost money on Government related
subcontracts
- #19—Burdensome paperwork requirements
- #35—More attractive commercial ventures.
The five most significant reasons the STAY OUT subcontrac-
tors had for not participating in DOD business were (listed
in order of most to least importance)
:
- #31—Inflexible Government procurement methods/policies
- #19—Burdensome paperwork requirements
- #35—More attractive commercial ventures
- #28—Inconsistent quality requirements
- #25--Prime contractor/higher level subcontractor
contracting methods/policies on DOD related business.
Several observations can be made from these data. First)
the five most significant reasons for each population subset
are different only in one category, reason 29 for the GET
OUT subcontractors, and reason 2 8 for the STAY OUT subcon-
tractors. Significantly, both these reasons are quality
related. More importantly, the five most significant
105
reasons for each population are included in the seven most
significant reasons identified for the overall population
responses in Figure 4-11.
The similarities and differences in the relative
significance of individual reasons for not participating in
DOD business also serve to illustrate the experiential and
perceptional differences between these two population
subsets. The most significant similarity for each group,
and for the overall population as well, was the significance
of inflexible Government procurement policies as the most
important reason for not participating in DOD business.
This might suggest that there is little difference between
the negative experiences of firms actually involved with DOD
business and the negative perceptions of firms not involved
in DOD business when trying to decide whether or not to not
participate in DOD business.
Important differences between the two groups involve
quality, paperwork and more attractive commercial sales
reasons. The GET OUT subcontractors ranked overly
restrictive (too high) quality as its second most important
reason, while the STAY OUT subset ranked overly restrictive
quality requirements as its seventh most important reason.
This difference could be due to the realitv of the GET OUT
subcontractors' experiences in producing DOD castings.
Overly restrictive quality is another way of expressing the
common observation that DOD over specifies the requirements
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for most of the products it procures. This is an especially
sensitive issue for the foundry industry. Numerous
foundries indicated to the researcher that they are often
confronted with tolerance specifications that exceed the
technical abilities of common casting processes used and
have little to do with the actual performance or function of
the casting being produced. Inconsistent quality require-
ments appeared to be much more important to STAY OUT firms
than GET OUT firms. The researcher does not know why, other
than to suggest that STAY OUT firms that used to be in DOD
business were frustrated to the point of leaving the market
due to inconsistent quality requirements levied on them by
higher level primes.
Burdensome paperwork requirements were much more
significant to the STAY OUT subcontractors than to the GET
OUT subcontractors. This again could represent a
perceptional issue, where those firms not participating in
DOD business perceive the amount of burdensome paperwork
required in DOD business to be worse than it actually is.
GET OUT firms that are actually dealing with "burdensome
paperwork" considered it a significant factor, but to a much
less extent than the STAY OUT firms. This is an important
distinction because burdensome paperwork was continually
cited as an example of why firms won't do business with the
Government
—
yet those firms that are doing business with the
Government (but intending to GET OUT) didn't rank its
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significance as high (fourth vs. second) as those firms
already out of the DOD the market. A final important
distinction between the two groups was the difference in the
relative significance of more attractive commercial sales as
a reason for not participating in DOD business. The GET OUT
firms ranked this reason fifth while the STAY OUT firms
ranked it third. This probably reflects the differences in
the amount of commercial experience each of these two groups
has had/does have. The STAY OUT firms have already made the
decision to pursue only commercial work and therefore would
be expected to rank significance of this reason higher.
However, it is important to note here, that all groups
ranked the significance of more attractive commercial sales
highly. This indicated to the researcher that DOD business
is not considered attractive relative to commercial
ventures. This conclusion would imply that under most
circumstances, commercial ventures will always look more
attractive to these firms. This also implied that in times
of industry restructuring and full capacity utilization
(such as in the 1980's), firms would always choose
commercial ventures over DOD business.
Question 4 provided the survey respondent an
opportunity to subjectively comment on any "other" reason
(not previously listed in the survey) that was important to
his decision not to participate in DOD business. The
respondent was also asked to rank the importance of this
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reason (if used) using the same scale for the previous 22
reasons. The following scaled responses, shown in Table 4-
1, were received for question 40.
TABLE 4-1
SCALED RESPONSES TO QUESTION 4








The 14 subjective "other" reasons provided by the
survey respondents which received the strongest responses of
four or five have been summarized below in Table 4-2 by the
researcher. These question 4 "other" reasons which
received a response of four or five were similar to many of
the significant reasons for not participating in DOD
business already analyzed. Of note was the first indication
that under no circumstances would a particular firm
participate in DOD business. The recurring emphasis on
quality issues also was important because it parallels the







(1) Would not participate in DOD business
under any circumstances
(1) Unfairly defaulted by the Government
(1) OSHA requirements forced me out of
business
(1) Lack of follow-on Government contracts
(1) My prime DOD contractor is too
inefficient and unknowledgeable about the
foundry business
(1) Commercial ventures are much less risky
(1) DOD expects me to build prototypes at my
own expense without guaranteeing a
follow-on contract
(3) Incomplete, or inaccurate out of date
techdata packages
(4) Inflexible, inconsistent quality require-
ments, lack of knowledgeable Government
personnel on quality issues.
The two final questions in the survey asked the
respondent to provide a subjective answer to the following
questions: m
Question 41. Of all the reasons listed in questions 18
through 40, what is the one reason you consider the most
important to your decision to not participate in DOD
business? Please explain, perhaps with an example, the
specifics of your choice.
Question 42. Under what conditions would you consider
getting into DOD business or staying in DOD business?
Please comment:
110
As discussed in Chapter III, these final two questions were
designed to provide one last opportunity for the survey
respondent to clearly discriminate which reason was the most
important for not participating in DOD business, and under
what conditions he would return to DOD business. These two
questions were also intended to act as a final quality
assurance check in terms of the consistency of a
respondent's answers. It was assumed that the survey
respondents could, and would, provide specific examples to
support their most important reasons for not participating
in DOD business. In order to facilitate computer analysis
of these two questions, the researcher analyzed all 4 8
responses to these two questions and then classified them in
one of the 22 "standard" reason categories or in the
question 4 "other" reason category. Blank responses were
classified as a zero or null response.
Figure 4-14 illustrates the results of this
analysis. Figure 4-14 used pie charts to compare the
responses to questions 41 and 42 to the overall skyscraper
plot responses to the 22 "standard" reasons by all 48 firms.
There appeared to be some deviation in the answers to
question 41 from what would be expected based on the overall
responses for the 2 2 standard reasons. Reason 19, burden-
some paperwork was an example of this deviation. It was the
number one response and was cited six times in question 41































business, yet it was the second most important reason in the
overall response analysis. Reasons 28, 29 and 3 were used
11 times in response to question 41. This paralleled their
importance in the overall response analysis where each of
these reasons was significant and scored above the mean
value of three. Reason 31, inflexible Government procure-
ment methods/policies and reason 35, more attractive
commercial sales both were cited five times in question 41.
This again generally paralleled their similar importance in
the overall mean response analysis but with a somewhat lower
emphasis. Reason 24 also stood out, but less strongly than
its overall response mean significance.
In the researcher's opinion if every respondent had
provided an example (eliminating the six null responses)
,
the responses to question 41 would have been more similar to
the overall response analysis. Another factor which could
have skewed these results was the inclusion of reason 40,
the "other" category for the first time into a combined
analysis. Finally the researcher may have incorrectly
interpreted and classified some of the responses therefore
biasing the data. The reader should note that reason 4 was
not included in the original overall response mean analysis
for the 48 firms.
Analysis of question 42 in Figure 4-14 provided
interesting insights into what these foundries considered
the most important condition to change in order to stay in.
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or return to DOD business. The largest number of responses
(14) were classified as "other" reasons. Seven of these 14
reasons all dealt with the same frustration; lack of
knowledgeable (of the foundry industry) Government personnel
to talk with in order to solve technical problems. These
foundries indicated that their inability to resolve
technical problems with knowledgeable Government
representatives would keep them out of this market until
these people were available. Three of the 14 indicated they
would not return to DOD business under any conditions and
the remaining four responses all varied. Twelve firms did
not respond to question 42 and these were classified as null
responses. The size of this null response could represent
apathy, frustration or lack of a clear idea about what
conditions would have to change in order to return to DOD
business. Reasons 28 and 29, both quality issues, received
11 responses. This again indicated to the researcher that
widespread frustration with excessive and inconsistent
quality requirements existed and was a significant reason
for not participating in DOD business. In the quality
reasons (reasons 28 and 29), cited for question 42,
excessive specifications bearing little relationship to
functional or performance requirements was cited in all 11
responses. Finally, five responses concerning inflexible
Government procurement methods/polices were used. This
response rate was much lower than the researcher assumed it
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would be. Given that inflexible procurement methods/
policies was repeatedly cited as the most significant reason
for not participating in DOD business, the researcher
expected this response to dominate both questions 41 and 42.
However, it did not, and it is the researcher's opinion that
the numerous quality issues cited by the respondents may be
indirect manifestations of what are really inflexible
Government procurement methods/policies "on" quality issues.
In a final analysis of the reasons why these
foundries decided not to participate in DOD business, the
researcher compared the survey responses to questions 41 and
42 between the GET OUT (21 firms) and STAY OUT (27 firms)
groups to see if there were any significant differences
between the reality of DOD business and perceptions about
it. Figure 4-15 presents this analysis. The most striking
difference between the GET OUT and STAY OUT responses to
question 41 again dealt with quality issues. Quality
reasons 28, 29 and 30 accounted for 29% of the responses for
the GET OUT subcontractors and only 18% of the responses for
the STAY OUT subcontractors. Reason 19, burdensome
paperwork was not cited by the GET OUT group but was cited
by 22% of the STAY OUT group. Other significant factors
previously cited, such as reasons 31 and 35, inflexible
procurement policies and more attractive commercial sales

















































































These findings support an evolving research
hypothesis that the quality problems being experienced by
the GET OUT group are actually more significant than the
perception of quality problems in the STAY OUT group. They
also suggest that the perception of burdensome Government
paper work requirements may be more significant than the
"actual" reality of the requirements.
Figure 4-16 compares the GET OUT and STAY OUT
responses to question 42. Again, quality reasons 2 8 and 2 9
represented 38% of the responses cited by the GET OUT group
versus 11% for the STAY OUT group. Frustration over quality
issues, in the opinion of the researcher, was clearly more
important to foundries currently in DOD business and appear
to be driving them out of the DOD market. Inflexible
Government methods/policies was cited 15% of the time by the
STAY OUT group versus five percent of the time for the GET
OUT group. The researcher cannot explain this except to
suggest that because the GET OUT group is still involved
with DOD quality problems these reasons tend to overshadow
what may really be inflexible procurement policies. The GET
OUT and STAY OUT groups cited "other" reasons 19% and 37% of
the time respectively. A breakdown of these reasons was
provided in the discussion of Figure 4-14. The majority of
those reasons dealt with the lack of knowledgeable
Government personnel to contact when attempting to resolve




































"other" responses for the GET OUT group were "under no
conditions" would they return to DOD business.
This concludes the analysis of the refusal reasons.
The researcher will now present several hypothesis tests
which were conducted on the data in order to determine if
any explanatory factors existed.
3 . Explanatory Factors Analysis
Earlier in this chapter the researcher presented a
demographic analysis of the survey results. This analysis
was used to validate a number of the researcher's
assumptions and to illustrate the differences between DOD
and NON-DOD contractors. If the reader will remember, NON-
DOD contractors represented those firms which passed both
survey filters. In comparing the demographic response data
of NON-DOD contractors and DOD contractors the researcher
hoped to isolate any significant explanatory factors which
discriminated between the two populations. An example of an
expected explanatory factor would be the hypothesis that
larger foundries are more likely to remain DOD contractors
than smaller foundries. In the opinion of the researcher,
based on the data presented in Figures 4-2 through 4-9, no
significant explanatory factors such as size, total sales,
casting process and metals used could be identified which
discriminated between DOD and NON-DOD contractors. The
graphical data representations were essentially uniform for
both populations in each figure. While no explanatory
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factor conclusions can be drawn from this observation, the
researcher can state that the two populations nearly mirror
each other.
Because no explanatory factors appeared in the
analysis of the DOD and NON-DOD populations the researcher
decided to perform the same type of analysis on the GET OUT
and STAY OUT populations by formulating the following series
of hypothetical questions:
1. Is the type of casting process an explanatory factor
for the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors?
2. Is the metal type an explanatory factor for the GET
OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors?
3. Is the number of employees an explanatory factor for
the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors?
4. Is the type of foundry business an explanatory factor
for the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors?
5. Is prime contractor involvement in DOD business an
explanatory factor for the GET OUT and STAY OUT
subcontractors?
6. Is total annual sales size an explanatory factor for
the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors?
Figures D-1 through D-6 graphically illustrate differences
between the GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractors for each of
these hypothetical questions and are contained in Appendix
D. Unfortunately, this data analysis also provided no




This chapter presented a detailed analysis of the survey
response data provided to the researcher. Data analysis was
also conducted on several important subsets of the total
survey population. While the data portrayed in this chapter
were not gathered from a statistically random sample, they
are useful in determining the attitudes and opinions of the
population of survey respondents. Approximately 2 0% of the
survey respondents indicated that they refuse, or intend to
refuse, to participate in DOD business. Because these
foundries are in a shrinking domestic nonferrous foundry
base, the reasons why they refuse to participate in DOD
business are particulary important to DIB planners and
policymakers
.
The most significant overall reasons for refusing, or
intending to refuse, to participate in DOD business are
remarkably consistent between the overall survey population
and its two subsets: the GET OUT subcontractors and STAY
OUT subcontractors. These most significant reasons tend to
substantiate many, but not all, of the reasons hypothesized
in the literature and studies reviewed by this researcher.
The differences were noted where appropriate, within the
text of this chapter.
Also presented in this chapter was a brief analysis of
the least important reasons for not participating in DOD
business. These least important reasons appear to
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contradict some of the frequently cited reasons in the
literature for not participating in DOD business. In Chapter
II, this researcher cited reasons considered important to a
subcontractor's decision not to participate in DOD business.
Some of those reasons which were cited, but do not appear to
be significant in this study, included the following:
- lack of production capability/capacity to accept
Government work,
- use of foreign sources of supply for production
materials,
- contract termination by the Government or prime
contractors,
- losing contracts to other competitors in a price
competition environment,
- adversarial prime/sub contractor relationships, and
- not knowing how to obtain Government subcontracts.
The six, clearly most significant
. reasons for not
participating in DOD business are listed below along with a
summary explanation/comment. These summary explanations/
comments were derived by the researcher from the various
examples provided by the survey respondents to question 41
and from informal, non-attribution interviews. These
statistically significant reasons for not participating in
DOD business are listed in order of most important to least
important.
Reason 31: Inflexible Government procurement policies/
methods. This was the most important reason for not
participating in DOD business throughout the study. All
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groups consistently ranked it the highest. Numerous
comments were received concerning the inability of the
Government to be flexible when it came to various "grey"
areas of procurement policy. Government procurement
policies were viewed as "unfair" and "rigged" in favor of
"other firms." An attitude of "us" versus "the Government"
was prevalent. The Government was widely believed to have
unfair advantages, particulary with problems and disputes.
Finally, there appeared to be nearly universal concern over
the lack of a common sense approach to the procurement
process with respect to the technical limitations of casting
as a manufacturing process.
Reason 19: Burdensome paperwork requirements . This
reason was consistently cited by all groups. However, it
was considered more significant by STAY OUT subcontractors.
Burdensome paperwork throughout the procurement process was
cited, particularly "paperwork not related to product
specification or quality." The perception was that a
growing magnitude of miscellaneous reports was strangling
all but the largest businesses. This added paperwork
creates additional overhead costs that these predominately
small businesses cannot afford. In many cases, the
"paperwork involved just to bid, costs more than the
product." The sheer size/volume of techdata packages and
bid and proposal packages was seen as overwhelming.
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Reason 35: More attractive commercial sales to non-DOD
prime contractors . This reason was consistently cited by
all groups. Again this reason was considered more
significant by STAY OUT subcontractors. Commercial sales to
NON-DOD contractors were universally cited as more
profitable and less aggravating. Specifications used in
commercial sales are widely recognized industry or
commercial standards. Knowledgeable customer engineers were
available to resolve technical problems. Commercial
customers encourage innovation and "listen" to the foundry's
suggestions for product improvements. Finally, in
commercial sales you don't have to deal with "bureaucrats."
One foundryman said "when I'm busy, why bother?"
Reason 29: Overly restrictive (too high) quality
standards . This reason was consistently cited by all
groups, however the GET OUT subcontractors found it more
significant. This reason reflected numerous contractor
frustrations over excessive, unrealistic specifications,
impossible to achieve specifications, and specifications not
consistent with the latest technology. Specifications were
often old, incomplete and incompatible with the casting
process required. Excessively "tight" dimensional
requirements were cited on surfaces which would ultimately
be machined down. "Gold plated" specifications which have
no relationship to performance or function are often
required, greatly increasing the cost and complexity of the
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casting. When these specification problems are identified
by the foundry and communicated to the procuring activity/
prime contractor "no one seems to care" or has the
"authority to answer my question." The need for stringent
specifications on aerospace, submarine and safety systems
was recognized. These frustrations apply to other non-
critical applications.
Reason 28: Inconsistent quality requirements . This
reason was consistently cited by all groups, however it was
more significant to the STAY OUT subcontractors. The only
thing that appeared more frustrating than excessive,
unrealistic specifications were inconsistent ones. Quality
standards for the same cast products are inconsistently
applied by different prime contractors and various military
customers. Lack of an universally acceptable industry
quality standard causes foundries to not "know where you
stand" until inspection of the final cast product.
Continual quality inspector personnel changes were cited as
contributing to the problem. Examples of production lots
that were accepted by one inspector and rejected by another
were offered. Quality inspectors from both the prime
contractors and the Government are inadequately trained to
do their jobs. Arbitrary rejection of cast products for
"purely cosmetic" defects unrelated to form, fit or function
was repeatedly cited.
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Reason 24: Low profitability/lost money on Government
related subcontracts . This final reason was also
consistently cited by all groups, however it was more
significant to GET OUT subcontractors reflecting their
actual experiences with DOD business. "It's easy to lose
money" was the common thread through most of the comments.
The "real" costs of this paperwork combined with the current
emphasis on price competition by the primes and the
Government has significantly cut profit margins. Lack of
"adequate, realistic definitions of requirements," changes
in specifications, the uncertainty of production volume and
"internal interruptions" also cause lost profits. The
increasing demands on contractors to fund development
programs increasingly place small business subcontractors at
risk. Commercial sales are universally believed to be safer
and more profitable.
In an increasingly competitive international market-
place for castings, each of these factors provides a
powerful incentive for a foundry to exit the DOD market-
place in order to avoid these risks, additional costs and
"frustrations." At least 20% of the population sampled by
this researcher has exited this market due to these (and
other) factors. In the researcher's opinion, this non-
participation rate is probably applicable industry wide.
These observations, when placed in the context of a
declining domestic foundry base, should be an alarming
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concern for Defense Industrial Base planners and military
users of high quality nonferrous castings. They portend
longer leadtimes, higher costs and fewer competitive high
quality producers in the future and whenever existing
capacity is fully utilized by commercial demand.
This concludes the analysis and interpretation of the
suirvey data. Chapter V presents the principal findings,
conclusions and recommendations resulting from this research
and suggests areas for future research.
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V. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
The objective of this study was to determine the extent
and reasons for nonferrous foundry subcontractor refusal to
participate in Department of Defense (DOD) business. The
principal findings and conclusions were derived through an
analysis of subcontractor survey response data and informal,
non-attribution telephonic and personal interviews. Several
significant findings and conclusions can be drawn from the
survey data and interview observations resulting from this
research. Some of these have implications for the Defense
Industrial Base (DIB) while others impact current procure-
ment and regulatory policies.
B. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
#1 . Incentives to not participate in DOD business exist
for DIB subcontractors . As discussed in the thesis, the
powerful economic and regulatory forces affecting all DOD
contractors are more acutely felt by lower tier subcontrac-
tors. Because of their small sizes, reduced technical and
managerial capabilities, and the limited financial resources
available to them, DOD subcontractors face greater economic
risks than the larger prime contractors when dealing with an
unstable DOD business environment. They face these
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increased risks without many of the beneficial or protective
contract flow down available to the primes. They are often
subject to the "risk-shifting" practices by the primes and
virtually never receive any of the IMIP, TECHMOD or MANTECH
type "seed" monies from the Government or prime contractors.
The increased risks, substantial regulatory requirements and
emphasis on price competition in today's DOD marketplace is
providing these subcontractors with powerful incentives to
pursue commercial vice DOD business. Until these policies
change, commercial sales will always appear more attractive,
particularly when existing capacity is strained by
commercial demand. These forces have caused substantial
erosion of the DIB in its critical lower tiers.
#2 . Defense Industrial Base capability/productivity
concerns should focus on lower tier subcontractors . The
ongoing controversy over the erosion of the DIB and whether
or not it is capable of supporting potential surge and
mobilization requirements is misdirected. Adequate or
excess productive capacity appears to exist in virtually all
segments of the DIB at the prime contractor level . While
the absolute number of firms has declined, overall capacity
generally has not. A much more significant capacity problem
exits in the supporting lower tiers of the DIB. This lower
tier subcontractor capacity problem significantly limits the
ability of the major prime contractors to "ramp up" and
utilize existing capacity. Industrial "bottlenecks" result
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in areas where a few critical industrial subcontractors
support numerous prime contractors. The bearing, forging,
foundry, semi-conductor, optical and machine tool and die
industries are examples of these "bottleneck" industrial
subcontractors. Sparrow missile production could be "ramped
up" in a matter of months. Developing the titanium foundry
capacity to support it could take years. Supporting these
lower tier industrial subcontractors are even lower level
service subcontractors such as the pattern makers in the
foundry industry. It takes five to ten years to train a
skilled pattern maker. Considering patterns are required in
100% of all castings produced, foundry capacity would be
constrained for years if faced with huge increases in demand
for new cast products (such as in war time)
.
#3 . The domestic nonferrous foundry base has declined
at least 15% in numbers of firms and in capacity over the
last ten years . The domestic foundry base has been
continually declining in both numbers of firms and in
capacity for the last 2 5 years. Restructuring within the
industry continues today with fewer and fewer high quality
nonferrous foundries able or willing to participate in DOD
business. Nonferrous castings have widespread, critical
applications in DOD aerospace, combat vehicle and naval
weapon systems. DOD consumption of high quality nonferrous
castings is growing yearly. Virtually 100% of certain
specialized castings such as titanium castings are consumed
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by DOD. High nonferrous foundry capacity utilization and
growing DOD requirements are creating longer leadtimes and
higher costs for high quality nonferrous castings. These
longer leadtimes lead to "bottleneck production delays" in
many weapon systems.
#4 . Tremendous subcontractor frustration over
Government/prime contractor procurement policies and quality
issues exists in the nonferrous foundry industry . As
analyzed in the thesis, the data obtained from interviews
and subcontractor surveys reflected extreme frustration with
Government/prime contractor procurement policies and quality
issues. This frustration is causing significant numbers of
nonferrous foundry subcontractors to exit the DOD market-
place. Procurement policies are universally perceived to be
unfair, inflexible, inconsistent and lacking common sense.
Quality issues are a chronic problem for these foundries.
Accurate, up-to-date specifications consistent with current
technology and the limitations of particular casting
processes are not available. There is widespread
frustration with excessive Government/prime contractor
overspecif ication which dramatically increases the
complexity and cost of cast products. More importantly,
when technical and quality problems are discovered, there
are few if any knowledgeable Government/prime contractor
representatives available with the authority to "make a
decision" or "to solve the problem." Lack of universal
131
quality standards and inconsistent application of the
existing ones leads to production delays and increased
product costs. Finally, subcontractors believe there are
few if any, adequately trained Government/prime contractor
quality inspectors. These frustrations make commercial
sales alternatives appear much more attractive than DOD
business.
#5. Twenty percent of the nonferrous foundry subcon-
tractors responding to the survey indicated that they
refuse, or intend to refuse, to participate in DOD business .
Twenty percent of the survey respondents indicated that they
intend to STAY OUT or GET OUT of DOD business. This non-
participation rate is remarkably similar to the Lamm
research findings cited in Chapter II of this thesis.
However, these findings differ significantly in the fact
that this researcher specifically targeted one industry and
then excluded all potential respondents who did not identify
themselves as subcontractors. The principal overall reasons
that nonferrous foundry subcontractors refuse to participate
in DOD business are: 1) inflexible Government procurement
methods/policies, 2) burdensome paperwork requirements and
3) more attractive commercial sales to non-DOD prime
contractors.
#6. Some hypothesized reasons for not participating in
DOD business were not important to nonferrous foundry
subcontractors . The literature review provided numerous
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hypothesized reasons for not participating in DOD business.
Many of these reasons were not important to nonferrous
foundry subcontractors. The four least significant reasons
for not participating in DOD business are: 1) inability to
use normal foreign sources of supply for production
materials, 2) do not have the production capability/
capacity to accept Government work, 3) previous contract (s)
terminated, and 4) lost DOD subcontract business to other
competitors. These least important reasons are important
because they challenge several significant assumptions often
made about the conditions faced by lower tier subcontrac-
tors. Production capacity/capability problems are often
assumed to be an acute problem for foundry subcontractors.
This was not substantiated by the data collected. It is
also often assumed that intense price competition at the
subcontractor level is driving firms out of the DOD market-
place for high quality, inexpensive castings. This too was
not substantiated by the data.
#6. There are differing reasons for GETTING OUT of DOD
business and STAYING OUT of DOD business amoncr nonferrous
foundry subcontractors . GET OUT nonferrous foundry
subcontractors are those subcontractors who currently
participate in DOD business but intend to stop. Their
reasons for refusing to participate in future DOD business
reflect the current reality of their experiences while
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participating in DOD business. The principal reasons why
these GET OUT firms intend to stop participating in DOD
business are: 1) inflexible Government procurement
methods/policies, 2) overly restrictive quality
requirements, and 3) low profitability. STAY OUT
nonferrous foundry subcontractors are those subcontractors
which never participated, or used to participate, in DOD
business. Their reasons for refusing to participate in DOD
business reflect their perceptions or memories of what
participation in DOD business would be/was like. The
principal reasons why these STAY OUT firms do not
participate in DOD business are; 1) inflexible Government
procurement methods/policies, 2) burdensome paperwork
requirements, and 3) more attractive commercial sales to
non-DOD prime contractors. The different reasons these two
groups have for not participating in DOD business are due to
experiential and perceptional factors.
#7 . Potentially serious weapon system procurement and
supply support problems will develop and worsen . As
discussed throughout this thesis, these findings carry
serious implications for current and future weapon systems
procurement leadtimes and costs. As the domestic foundry
base continues to restructure, fewer foundries with reduced
capacity will remain. These remaining foundries will be
increasingly unwilling to accept DOD business as long as
existing capacity is utilized by more attractive commercial
134
demand. Domestic nonferrous foundry capacity utilization is
currently over 77%, and has remained over 70% this entire
decade. Full capacity utilization of exiting foundries,
combined with fewer foundries willing to participate in DOD
business, will aggravate leadtime problems and create higher
costs. Frustration over Government/prime contractor
procurement and quality policies combined with an intense
price competition DOD business environment will cause this
trend to worsen over time.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
#1 . Continue to expand acquisition streamlining
efforts . An unnecessarily costly and complex procurement
environment currently exists. This environment
unfortunately provides numerous economic and psychological
incentives to small businesses to exit the DIB in order to
avoid such things as burdensome paperwork and overspecif ica-
tion. Every effort possible should be made to eliminate
unnecessary regulations, paperwork, non-commercial
specifications and to introduce "common sense, sound
business judgment" management philosophies and procurement
practices. Streamlining efforts should evaluate and take
into account the cumulative effects of "piece meal"
regulatory, tax and profit policies imposed over the last
five years and attempt to minimize their negative impact.
#2 . Continue and expand efforts to "educate" small
businesses on how to do business with DOD . Much of the
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frustration involved with doing business with the Government
results from a lack of understanding. Misunderstanding, or
not understanding, Government procurement policies, bidding
methods, and quality requirements is frustrating for the
foundry industry and ultimately results in fewer competitive
sources for the Government. Small businesses, to the extent
possible, must be made to understand the objectives, spirit
and intent of the various procurement policies affecting
them. All interests would be well served by expanding such
efforts as DOD procurement workshops sponsored by both
industry trade associations and DOD activities.
#3 . Initiate an industry/DOD effort to develop
universal qualitv standards for production, inspection and
acceptance of cast products . This effort should include the
foundry industry, major DOD prime contractors and DOD
representatives. Engineers, production managers and
procurement personnel from each organization should
participate. Universal production, inspection and
acceptance quality standards incorporating the latest
technologies as well as the inherent limitations of
different castings processes should be developed by this
group. Military specifications should be based on, and
consistent with, these standards where ever possible. Once
these quality standards have been developed both industry
and Government buyers and inspectors must be trained in
their consistent and appropriate use.
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#4 . POD should emphasize value over price in
specialized high quality castings . DOD and prime
contractors should emphasize the "best value concept" when
developing and maintaining foundry capacity for high
quality, specialized castings. Intense price competition at
the subcontractor level combined with the numerous factors
already discussed are forcing high quality foundries out of
the DOD marketplace. Non-price factors such as technical
ability, previous quality performance and manufacturing
process controls must be strongly emphasized in the
procurement process in order to maintain a high quality
nonferrous foundry base willing to accept DOD business.
D. ANSWERS TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The following are a reiteration of the primary and
subsidiary research questions. Their answers are based on
the conclusions drawn from this research effort.
Primary Research Question—To what extent do foundry
subcontractors refuse to participate in DOD business ?
Twenty percent of the nonferrous foundry subcontractors
responding to the survey indicated they refuse, or intend to
refuse, to participate in DOD business.
Subsidiary Research Questions—What are the key reasons
for refusing DOD business ? The seven most significant
reasons for refusing to participate in DOD business are
(listed in order of most to least importance)
:
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3. more attractive commercial sales to non-DOD prime
contractors
4. overly restrictive (too high) quality standards
5. inconsistent quality requirements
6. low profitability/lost money on Government related
subcontracts
7 . prime contractor/higher level subcontractor
contracting methods/policies on DOD related business.
Can any foundry industry trends be identified? The
foundry industry is restructuring. It is declining in
numbers of firms and overall capacity. Existing capacity in
the nonferrous foundries is nearly fully utilized. Increas-
ing numbers of the remaining nonferrous foundries are
apparently unwilling to participate in DOD business. This
trend should be expected to worsen over time.
What procurement reforms would have the greatest impact
on foundry willingness to accept DOD business ? Streamline
current procurement policies and regulations. Simplify the
bidding and proposal process, eliminate unnecessary
paperwork, develop and maintain current commercial standard
quality specifications for production, inspection and
acceptance. Train Government/prime contractor personnel in
their appropriate use. Decrease current policy emphasis on
price competition and emphasize a "best value to the
Government concept."
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What are the implications for procurement policy? The
implications for procurement policies are substantial.
Significant changes in current procurement regulations and
their management philosophies will be required to implement
these changes. These changes are required to do two things:
1) maintain a viable domestic nonferrous foundry base which
is capable of, and willing, to participate in the DIB, and
2) obtain high quality, reasonably priced nonferrous
castings. The researcher has no doubt that changing these
statutory requirements and their associated crushing burden
of costly, inefficient and ineffective regulations will be a
monumental task—but a necessary one.
E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
1. Database Searches
Further study in the area of the reasons why firms
refuse to participate in Government business is required.
Additional databases not used by this researcher but worthy
of exploration in future research include Department of
Commerce databases associated with its U.S. Industrial
Outlook publications. These databases contain a wealth of
industrial economic, trade, production and technical data.
The future researcher could also explore the Dun and
Bradstreet Market Services database in greater detail for
data at the individual firm level.
The researcher should be reminded that the use of
any Government maintained database (such as the previously
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described PASS database) will probably introduce survey
sampling bias. This is due to the inherent contradiction of
trying to locate firms that do not want to participate in
Government business by researching Government databases
maintained for the purpose of expanding and cataloging




Future research in this subject area could prove
beneficial if the research methodology was changed from
"chunk" surveying populations believed to be unwilling to
participate in DOD business to an analysis of critical
weapon systems and the prime/subcontractors supporting those
systems. The research should focus on any production
constraints/bottlenecks that may exist at the prime
contractor level due to limited or sole source
subcontractors. Based on prime contractor purchasing
department inputs, a survey of the capabilities, capacity
and attitudes of these subcontractors along with a search
for known or suspected firms which are unwilling to
participate in DOD business could follow. Prime contractors





Alternative industries could be chosen as candidates
for the same research methodology employed by this
researcher. These candidate industries should be chosen
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from the list of "critical" DIB industries identified by
this researcher and others. The forging or machine tool
industries would be logical and important candidates.
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APPENDIX A
REASONS WHY COMPANIES REFUSE TO PARTICIPATE IN DOD BUSINESS
Cited*




More attractive commercial ventures
Low profitability
Government attitudc(s)
Delays in making awards
Inconsistent quality requirements/
standards too high





Unfair application of regulations




Lost business to competitors
Prime contractor/higher-tier sub-
contractor methods
Work set aside for small business








































"Forty-seven firms failed to prioritize the reasons.
Source: Lanun, "Why Firms Refuse DOD Business: An Analysis
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This is a letter of introduction and a request for
assistance in a Master's Thesis research project on the
Defense Industrial Base.
My name is Lt. Jon A. Schauber and I am an active duty
Naval Officer in the U. S. Navy Supply Corps. I am
currently a full time graduate student at the Naval
Postgraduate School where I am working on an M.S. in
Management.
My Master's Thesis research work is focused on the lower
tiers of the Defense Industrial Base and concerns over its
apparent erosion. Specifically, I am tying to analyze the
reasons why capable subcontractors refuse to participate in
Department of Defense (DOD) business. My research goal is
to determine the extent of the problem, (if it exists) , and
the key reasons for refusing to accept DOD business.
The Castings Industry is critical to the Department of
Defense. It is often cited by government policy makers as
an example of how our rapidly shrinking industrial base is
creating unacceptably long leadtimes for components in
today's complex weapons systems. Worse; it is often used as
an example to illustrate the negative consequences of
ineffective government policies, lack of industry capital
investment and subsidized foreign competition.
For these reasons, and with your help, I would like to
focus my research efforts on the Castings Industry. Could
you please take a few minutes of your time to complete the
enclosed survey and return it at your earliest convenience ?
You may not be asked to complete the entire survey and all
of your responses will remain strictly confidential. The
survey results will be used for academic research analysis
on Defense Industrial Base concerns and for recommending DOD
procurement policy changes. Hopefully, any policy
recommendations resulting from this survey will help improve
and strengthen the business relationship between the
Department of Defense and companies such as yours.




Lt. Jon A. Schauber, SC, USN
Naval Postgraduate School
SMC # 1517
Monterey, CA. 93 94 3
SURVEY OF NONFERROUS CASTING INDUSTRY OPINION
ON DEFENSE SUBCONTRACT BUSINESS
This survey is designed to solicit your ideas and
concerns about Department of Defense (DOD) procurement
policies and procedures at the subcontractor level. The
goal of the survey is to determine why firms do not desire
to participate in DOD business at the subcontractor level.
Please take a few minutes of your time to give us your
honest answers to these survey questions. You may remain
anonymous if you wish. All answers will remain confidential
and will only be used for research analysis. Please circle
one answer per question which best describes your situation
or answer in the space provided. Thank you for your
assistance.
1. Please briefly describe your primary cast products:
2. Please describe the commercial and/or DOD uses for your
primary cast products; (if known)
My primary Standard Industrial Code (SIC) is
What casting process do you primarily use?
1. Investment casting
2. Die casting
3. Sand mold casting















6. Please indicate your approximate number of employees.
1. to 19
2. 20 to 49
3. 50 to 99
4. 100 to 249
5. 250 to 499
6. 500 to 999
7. 1000 and over




8. If you answered yes to question 7, please indicate the
total employment of your company and your affiliated
companies:
1. to 19
2. 20 to 49
3. 50 to 99
4. 100 to 249
5. 250 to 499
6. 500 to 999
7. 1000 and over
9. Which of the following best describes your foundry
business?
1. exclusively jobbing (production for sale to others)
2. primarily jobbing





10. If you answered #1 or #2 in question 9, are the firms




3. I don't know
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11. What percentage of your sales go to?
1. Local customers (within 100 miles
radius)






12. What is the
your company?
1. Less than $100,000
2. $100,000 to $500,000
3. $500,001 to $1,000,000
4. $1,000,001 to $5,000,000
5. $5,000,001 to $10,000,000
6. $10,000,001 to $50,000,000
7. $50,000,001 to $100,000,000
8. over $100,000,000
approximate total annual sales volume of




IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO QUESTION 13, PLEASE STOP AND RETURN
THIS SURVEY USING THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOR YOUR
TIME AND EFFORT.
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 13, PLEASE CONTINUE THE
SURVEY
.
DEFINITION ; In this study "Defense" procurement, business
and contracting all refer to sales of materials or services
to the Department of Defense. These sales may be direct to
the government, while acting as a prime contractor for the
Department of Defense, or indirect , when a subcontractor
sells to a prime contractor who is doing business with the
government
.
Using the above definition of defense business, please
consider the following statements concerning DOD business:
#1. I currently participate in DOD business but intend
to get out of it .
#2. I currently do not have any DOD business and intend
to stay out of it.





IF YOU ANSWERED NO TO QUESTION 14, PLEASE STOP AND RETURN
THIS SURVEY USING THE ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU FOR TIME
AND EFFORT.
IF YOU ANSWERED YES TO QUESTION 14, PLEASE CONTINUE THE
SURVEY
.
15. Which of the statements listed above concerning DOD
business best describes your situation?
1. I'm IN DOD business but intend to GET OUT
2. I'm OUT of DOD business and intend to STAY OUT
IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER #1 ABOVE, PLEASE SKIP TO QUESTION 18.
IF YOU CHOSE ANSWER #2 ABOVE, PLEASE CONTINUE.
16. If you do not currently participate in DOD business
which of the following best describes your DOD business
experience?
1. We have never tried making sales to the government.
2. We have tried but never made sales to the government.
3. We have made such sales in the past but do not now.
17. If you were involved in DOD business in the past but are
not now, how long ago were you involved in DOD business?
1. to 6 months ago
2. 7 to 12 months ago
3
.
1 to 2 years ago
4 2 to 5 years ago
5. greater than 5 years ago
Please carefully review all of the following reasons for not
participating in DOD business. After reviewing all of the
reasons, please indicate the importance of each reason to
your decision to get out of DOD business or to stay out of
DOD business. Please use the following response scale for
each question:
1 = not important at all to my decision
2 = somewhat important to my decision
3 = important to my decision
4 = very important to my decision
5 = the most important reason for my decision
My/our company does not participate in, or intends to stop
participating in, DOD business because of:
18. prime contractor late payment or non-payment of bills:12 3 4 5
19. burdensome paperwork requirements:12 3 4 5
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20. prime contractor contract flow-down requirements:12 3 4 5
21. adversarial government/prime contractor relationships:12 3 4 5
22. adversarial prime/sub contractor relationships:12 3 4 5
23. uncertainty/instability of government business base:12 3 4 5
24. low profitability/lost money on government related
subcontracts
:
12 3 4 5
25. prime contractor/higher level subcontractor contracting
methods/policies on DOD related business:12 3 4 5
26. we don't know how to obtain government subcontracts:12 3 4 5
27. government/prime contractor auditing requirements/
procedures:12 3 4 5
28. inconsistent quality requirements:12 3 4 5
29. overly restrictive (too high) quality standards:12 3 4 5
30. acceptance/rejection problems with my product:12 3 4 5
31. inflexible government procurement methods/policies:12 3 4 5
32. delays in making awards/ frequent contract changes:12 3 4 5
33. inefficient production levels/rates:12 3 4 5
34. we have heard too many "horror" stories about DOD
business: 12 3 4 5
35. more attractive commercial sales to non-DOD prime
contractors:12 3 4 5
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36. do not have production capability/capacity to accept
government work:12 3 4 5
37. government will not let me use my normal foreign sources
of supply for production materials/requirements:12 3 4 5
38. lost DOD subcontract business to other competitors:12 3 4 5
39. previous contract (s) terminated:12 3 4 5
40. other reason(s):
41. Of all the reasons listed in questions 18 through 40,
what is the one reason you consider the most important to
your decision to not participate in DOD business? Please
explain, perhaps with an example, the specifics of your
choice.
42. Under what conditions would you consider qettincf into
DOD business or staying in DOD business? Please comment:
150
43. I am willing to discuss my views by:
a. phone: yes no










THIS IS THE END OF THE SURVEY. THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME,




STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO SURVEY QUESTIONS 18-39
The following GRAFSTAT statistical analysis was
performed on each of the 22 survey refusal reasons and their
associated responses. This analysis includes frequency

























































-" n oi in CN
I— t— DOoo>-<i- "-m
to 10 o r-. u3 oi




Ul < •-" t— I- I—
-I '— I- 2 2 2
UJ >(/1COZUJ UIUI
_l UJlO>-iUJO oo
h- U/U2(DUJL0CJQr2Q:Ce • •omo< zoq;uj<ujujzx
ui< u) -51— uiQ.i-'q.CL>-i<
_)-j •2Q[Ijq:cl|qTI22













































UJ CO I-" UJ o2 o Ul CO u tr
< 2 o tr Ul
Ul • 5 I— Ul a.2 o Ul q: CL I _ . .
I— :si 3 I in Ul in lo
xc/oco:^inrM2r^OTX
cj o2 a: q; •












CO CD Ul ^2 < q:




































































































ui < 1—1 1— ^- h- .^
-1 •-' 1- Z 2 Z
LiJ >(/0t/1ZLLj UJUJ q:—1 UJl/1—iLlJO OO
ujij-zolijc/ioq:zq:q: • • omo< zoQ:Lj<LdLJZx





















































K- CD in fo CM
cn 1— O r^ CD CM >- in
in rv •»»- o toT O _l LU r^ •<»- ^ lo >- in
CM -1 3 DO < O •* CN >- o •- •- >- rr) <^ m >- in
2L 8 t
A0N3n03yj
UJ < --i I— I— h-2 -I -< I- 2 2 ZO LJ >L0L02UJ LUUJ
-•—l UJ10—<LJ(J OCJ
t— ujLi.2QLLjL0oct:2Q:Q: • •
ocrio< 20Q:Lij<ujLiJ2x
liJ< LJ -5t— LlJQ.'-'CLQ-'— <
—1—1 -SQujcraiQTl^^



















































m rv r- •*
Q. t— t— (D r^ — CSI ^ m
C/1 cn in in «D •<«- o)
UJ t—
•
fO _J UJ •* ro «- en — if>
q: I IM -1 rj oo
n
CM
O < O '* CM ^ o — >- ^ CM n in ^ m
i/iz t— "^




>-• UJ _J _l _l
K- _l « -. «
< '-I 1— (— t—
- I- z z z
> to CO Z UJ UJ UJ
UJ C/) - UJ O CJ o
ZQujc/icjcrzcra: • •
< zoq;uj<ujujzx












































































00 r^ OO OOO (D <J1 0>
rv ^ oo in
CM fo r~ in
CM _i 3 00 •O < O * CM «-
— in
— in
•- CM fo in •- in
91 ZL e
ADN3n03yd




1— 7 T z
UJ > t/1 C/1 z UJ UJ UJ
•—
<
_i UJ l>0 •—
t
UJ C) <J C)
t— UJ L. 7 n UJ 1/1 C) rr z a: a:
o m C) < o (Y UJ < UJ UJ z X
UJ < UJ . ^ 1— UJ
^
Q. Q. <
—J _i 3 n UJ rr
'V
n 1 1 2 2









































































f^ * «o in
•- n ^ o








































1-1 Ki <o cN r>.
»— CD n CO <N "-in
to o — cN n
<«-_jLU cM'^-r~ '-in





g_J >-i t- Z z z
Lij >cnoizuj uui
-_l UJC^'-'UJO uu















t- z z z
to on z UI Id UJ q:to —• bJ cj
UI (/I q: z q: ce • •ZOQ;uj<tdUJZX5l— UJO-^CLCL — <













































































Ul < •— t-g_l ^ »- z
Ul >tot/)Zuj
"-_J UJWl — UJO uo
»— uiuzQuii/iuQczoro: • •(JCDO< ZOQ:ixJ<ljliJZXUl< UJ •St-LdO.i-'Q.Q. — <







Z -I — •- z z zO UJ >0O(/)ZUJ UJUI
•——I uiioi-iujtj cjcj
t— tdUZQUItOOQCZai • •
ucDO< zoq:ui<uiujzxUl< U)
-S*— UIQ.'— Q.Q. — <
_j_i •3QuJq:q.TqtT22



































8 H^ r^ (3) »- 0)
CM
to to
— n f^ m — m




I CS -1O < 8 •*• cN^o»-»-»-»-'nin — i/i Lu
3 to
o »— O U Ul UJz
Ul — Ul -1 -1-1
a
t- _!«—.«





































^ o m 00 »- 1
—
Q. t— f— r~ • <o '- m Cdto in in 03 m 00
UJ o» —1 UJ m <r 00 •- lO <q: I CN _I 3 00 • o
CN





z zZ -J *- t- zO UJ >lOC/)ZUJ UJUJ
»-i_j ujtn—'Ujo cjot-uju-ZQujooooczoro:OCDO< zoq:uj<ujuj
uj< UJ •5i-ujq.'-.na_
_i_j •soCjQcq.ToT I
















































5 85 CDin Ul








8 z C7) 0)
00 t— *-^ rx CN iD CM D
CN in 1— (O »— OO •« ^- m
in r— 03 * ^ C7^
CNJ 2 X en _ Ul ^ K) o m ^ mO CM _ s oo o u.t— o < * lO >- 1 CN •- CM ^ m in — in























< •-• - I— t—
_ _ z z zO Ul >(n(nzuj uiui
— _i ujto^uicj oo
t— uil-zqujooocczqiq: •OCDO< ZOQ:ui<liJUJZXUJ< Ul -St— UlQ.«Q.Q-^<
_i_l -30^10:0.701133



















































^- t— r^ oi r^ •- m
in in 1^ — t- O) Q::
^ ^ _j UJ O) CM • kT) in T- m <X. m -i -) OD • «—
o < o •« n — 1 to ^ K) ^ in in — lo Q_
tn 1
t— z y
^ o LJ Ul UJ ^-N
z z




»— UJU-ZQUJinOQ^ZCtQ: • •oa30< 20Q:uj<ujuJZX






































g-j — t- z z z
Ul >intnzuj UUJ
•——I ujin — ujcj (j(_>
t— UJU-ZQujinottrzcECt: • •(_)CDO< zoq:uj<ujujzxUJ< U) •5'— UJCL"Q.a-—'<
_j_i -201110:0.101132

























0: q: z ^
O 8 o CM f^ ^
m >- t— CTl n (N tn ^ in 13
in in fv ^ O rv CPz n -J UJ CT) <£) fO ^ in
o X o _J 3 OO O l^
in
UJ
o < O CSJ "- 1 — »- — m in in - in





































































O) rv «D <0
(N VD If) ^
r^ lO (N O3 03 • • •O <N •- o — —
— m
sn — lO





_ ^ _ z z
UI >(0(/1ZUJ UIUI









UI 5 1/1I/) UI










in "O O) (N •- lO
O) 10 10 >-
CM z I rsi —
1
UJ (D >n 1/1 ^ lO
»—
K1






— UI _l _J _l
^ 2
Z _i — t- z z zO UI >(/l(/)Zui UIUJ
—
_i uii/1 — uicj 00t-uiuzQuii/ioazorcr •umo< zoq:ui<uiuizxUJ< UI -^l— UIQ. — Q.Q.-- <
_j_i •20ui3:q.TqlT22













































































CD t^ UD •- — in
r^ oo U3 to
•* *






2 -J " t- 2 2 2O LU >LnOOZUJ LJUJ
>—
_) LlJIO^LlJO oo
-UJL..2QUJ00OQiZQ:Q: • •omo< zoq:llj<14jujzx
UJ< U) •St-UID.^Q.Q.^i
_i_i •2oCjq:q.TqTT22


































UJ < •-• t—Z -I — t- z
o -Li > in in z UI
•-I
_J LU to —• UJ Ot-uJLi.zQujinoQ:ZQ:Q:OQDO< ZOCrUJ<UJUJZXUJ< UJ -5*— UJQ.~Q.I1-— <
_i_i •2QuJQ;q.iQTT22




































m 1— 1— •^ •* r^ <» ^ in 13
in m o m V— ro
cnz ^ _j UJ <£) m fo m m ,-. ino X n _ -) on • —
1—
in

































f^ ^ oi o
00 o m (x>
_l UJ ^ (^ ^ .
_) 3 00 • • • O













ui oX in X z
>-• Ul —I _l —I
I— _l 1—1 «—-<
< '-' I— t— h-
-- H- z z z
> in tn z UJ UJ UJ
























































r-> .- 00 +
DO "*- CN <N










UJ < — t— - h-Z -I - H- Z Z Z
o UJ >(ninzuj ujui
«-i_i ujin — ujo ocj
-UJU-ZQUIinOQCZQiQ: • •
cjcDO< zoq:uj<ujuj^xUJ< UJ -St— UJCl.'-iQ.CL'-'<
_i_i •2qCjq:Q.TqTT22














































ID (O CO in
rv oo in csi
rn o fO «
o <• o
CD




Z O UJ LJ UJ
UJ •-- UJ —
I
—i -J3 h- -I — «- —
UJ < "- >— I— »—Z -I ^ t- z z z
o ui >(/)cnzuj ujtj
•——I UJC/)—'UJU CJO
^-UJU-ZQuJ^/^uti:zcrQ: • •
ocQO< zoa:uj<ujujzxUJ< UJ -5*— UJO. — Q.Q-"-^
-1-1 •3QCdQ:Q.TQTT23
















































i_i r^ t^ oo
t— t— o> in in
to • o — •-
—I UJ in o o (o
_i 3 (D • • • • (\i
— m




a < « - 1—1—
Z -J — - z z zO UJ >totnzuj uiuj
•-i—l UJC/I^UJtJ CJO
t— uju.zQuj(/)ott:ZQ:tt: • •
cjCDO< zoq;uj<ujujzxUJ< UJ -^l— UJQ. — Q.Q.—'<
_i_i -^qCjccq-TqTT^^












HYPOTHESIS TESTS FOR DIFFERENCES IN
GET OUT/STAY OUT CONTRACTORS
The following figures graphically illustrate the
differences between GET OUT and STAY OUT subcontractor
responses to suirvey questions 4, 5, 6, 9, 10 and 12. This
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